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Democracy deficit in the Arab world
The Arab Humań Development Reports 2002 and 2003, prepared by a group of leading 
Arab intellectuals under the auspices of the UNDP and the Arab Fund for Social and 
Economic Development brought a very pessimistic view of the Arab world.1 The com- 
bined gross domestic product of the 22 Arab countries was lesser than Spain’s. Labor 
productivity in these countries dropped between 1960 and 1990, while it soared else- 
where in the world. Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates of economic 
growth. An exploding population cannot be supported by scarce resources and every 
other citizen is ready to emigrate. At the same time, the wealthiest 85,000 Saudis have 
overseas assets of $700 billions.
At the same time, as Freedom House survey showed, there is also a dra- 
matic gap between the levels of freedom and democracy in Arab countries and the 
rest of the world.2 First of all, there are no true Westem-type democracies in the 
Arab world or really free Arab countries. In particular, none of the 16 Arab major- 
ity countries has a democratically elected govemment. Secondly, in the last more 
or less three decades, this world, as a whole, has not seen any significant improvement 
in political openness, respect for human rights, and transparency, contrary to the trends 
in all other parts of the world. Democracy is now present in states following every 
major religious or philosophical tradition: Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, 
Muslim and Jewish. It is present in rich as well as very poor states, in big and smali 
countries. But, as Larry Diamont pointed out, “by any category that is meaningful in 
the world today, there is only one set of countries that is completely undemocratic: the
1 Arab Human Development Report 2002 and 2003, New York, www.undp.org.
2 Freedom in tlie World 2002: The Democracy Gap, Freedom House, New York 2002, p. 5.
Arab world.”3 The Economist described the State of democracy in all Arab countries in 
the following table:
Democracy in the Arab world, 2004
Score: 1 -  dismal, 10 -  perfect
State Political
Freedom1
Rule 
of Law2
Religious
Freedom3
Press Free­
dom
Economic
Openness4
Woinen’s
Rights5
TOTAL
Morocco 4 6 6 6 7 6 35
Lebanon 4 4 6 6 7 7 34
Iraq 4 1 7 7 8 5 32
Jordan 4 6 6 3 7 6 32
Qatar 3 6 4 4 8 6 31
Bahrain 3 6 4 3 8 6 30
Kuwait 4 6 4 6 6 4 30
Palestinian
Territories
4 2 5 5 7 7 30
Tunisia 1 3 9 1 7 8 29
United Arab 
Emirates
1 6 4 3 9 6 29
Oman 2 6 4 1 7 6 26
Yemen 4 3 4 6 5 4 26
R-ypt 2 4 4 3 5 6 24
Sudan 3 1 2 5 7 3 21
Syria 1 2 8 1 1 7 20
Algeria 3 2 4 3 2 4 18
Libya 1 2 4 1 2 5 15
Saudi Arabia 0 3 0 2 7 1 13
Source: The Economist, April 3, 2004.
1 The right to vote in fair elections, oust rulers from office, form political parties
2 Respect for human rights, independence of judiciary, access to speedy justice, humane treatment in 
prison
' Freedom of worship, freedom from State intervention in religion and from religious intervention in 
State affairs
4 Freedom to invest, freedom from bureaucratic control and corruption
5 Level of political, economic and social equality
On the 0-60 points scalę the most democratic Arab State, Morocco, barely crossed 
the middle point, while several countries, with Saudi Arabia at the top, did not even 
reach a ąuarter of the possible level of democracy.
This situation increasingly worries enlightened intellectuals in the Arab 
world and Western governments. It is typical for sudden and violent conflicts, 
which can de-stabilize the whole region of high strategie importance, and for fur- 
ther spread of terrorism. This is why, Arab elites and Western govemments try to 
analyze causes for such State of affairs and propose remedies for change.
3 L. D iam o n d , „Universal democracy?”, Policy Review, June 2003.
According to the authors of Arab Humań Development Report, the main 
reason for the dramatic situation in the Arab world is poor govemance. “But the 
wave of democracy that transformed govemance in most of the world has barely 
reached the Arab world... The freedom deficit undermines human development 
and it is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.” 
A group of experts from the Camegie Endowment for International Peace, on the 
other hand, believe that there have been three major reasons for democracy deficit 
in the Middle East: (1) lack of previous experience with democracy, which, for 
example, facilitated transitions in Central and Eastem Europę; (2) lack of the pro- 
longed periods of economic growth and the resulting changes in educational and 
living standards as well as life styles, which led several Asian countries to demo- 
cratic changes (in fact there is a socioeconomic deterioration in the Middle East); 
(3) lack of a positive “neighborhood effect”, the regional, locally exerted pressure 
to conform, which helped to democratize Latin America.4 Moreover, what makes 
the democratization of the region more difficult to achieve is: a fear of illiberal 
Islamie movements, which have broad support in most of the Arab countries and 
which can win democratic elections, if introduced, and while in power abrogate 
democracy itself; the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the fact that is 
regularly exploited by rulers of the Arab countries to deflect attention of their citi- 
zens from domestic problems; the negative perception of the United States, whose 
promotion of democracy in view of Washington’s support of Israel and occupation 
of Iraq is perceived as a new American attempt to dominate the Arab world.5
There are, naturally, a number of more fundamental ąuestions related to the 
potential democratization of the Islamie states. Is democratization in the Western 
meaning of the term possible in such states at all, especially in the countries whose 
rulers use Islam to legitimate themselves and where religious establishment plays sig- 
nificant role in politics?6 Opinions on the matter have been diversified.7. For example, 
Samuel P. Huntington in his early works presented the view that “Islam ... has not 
been hospitable to democracy”.8 Elie Kedourie believed that “the idea of democracy is 
quite alien to the mind-set of Islam”.9 Similarly, Lisa Anderson explained, that: 
“Islam’s failure to distinguish the realms of Caesar and God, its insistence that sover- 
eignty rests with God and that the essence of the law is divinely revealed and therefore
4 M. O tta w a y , T. C a ro th e r s ,  A. H a w th o rn e , D. B ru m b e rg , “Democratic Mirage in the Middle 
East” , Policy Brief Camegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2002.
5 Some reformists would not even use the term ‘democracy’ to describe their plans “because in the Arab 
world that term has become a codeword for hip-hugger blue jeans, sex on television, dysfunctional family life and 
all other aspects o f western culture the Arabs find objectionable”, K. P o l la c k  and D. B y m a n , “Democracy as 
realism”, Prospect, April 2003, p. 27.
6 F. G. G a u se  III, Oil Monarchies. Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, Council of 
Foreign Relations, New York 1994.
7 See, e.g., R. K a z e m  E l- S o lh ,  “Representative democracy in the Arab region: An overview”, in: 
Y. a l - H a s s a n ,  The Dialogue between Civilizations, The Emirates Center for Developmental and Strategie Stud- 
ies, Sharjah, UAE 1995, pp. 199-211.
8 S. P. H u n t in g to n ,  “Will more countries become democratic?’, Political Science Quarterly 1984, no. 2,
p. 208.
9 E. K e d o u r ie ,  Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC 
1992, p. 1.
beyond human emendation, its discriminatory treatment of women and non-MusIim 
minorities, all appear quite inconsistent with democratic politics.”10
According to Adam Gamfmkle, Arab societies, although in different de- 
grees, lack three pre-requisites for democracy11: (1) the belief that the source of 
political authority is intrinsic to society (“of the people, by the people, for the peo- 
ple”). Muslims believe that it does come from God or from an accepted source 
outside the society; therefore the idea of political pluralism as well as the legiti- 
macy of a “loyal opposition” cannot be accepted, while tolerance for any other set 
of social, political or religious principles that the Islamie one amounts to heresy (2) 
a concept of majority rule; without it, the idea of elections as a mean to form a 
govemment does not make sense. Yet Muslims are used to govemance through 
consensus-building so the idea that someone who has won 51 per cent of the vote 
in an election should get 100 per cent of power, while the person who has won 49 
per cent should get none is perceived by them as both illogical and dangerous: an 
invitation to civil strife. Moreover, in Western democracy, it is the majority view 
that prevails, but in Islam matters should be decided according to the Koran and the 
tradition of the prophet Mohammed and not according to the views of the people.12 
(3) eąuality of all citizens before the law: this idea is in conflict with nearly all 
Islamie traditional authority, where men are “more equal” than women, the edu- 
cated more than illiterate, the pious more than non-religious, the elderly more than 
the youth, and members of the ruling family more than the commons.
At the same time, there are also quite opposite views, explaining that de­
mocracy can be implemented in Muslim societies and states. First of all, there are 
reasonably democratic Muslim states, like Turkey. Then, there are millions of 
Muslims living in democratic states of Europę, United States or Asia who have 
successfully combined their religion with demands of the democratic system. Ac­
cording to Huntington, who later changed his mind, the “Islamie doctrine ... con- 
tains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy” and that 
the only question is to find out how and under what circumstances elements in 
Islam favorable to democracy ‘can supersede the undemocratic aspects’.”13 In turn, 
Gamfmkle stressed, that “there certainly are theological and cultural predicates for 
democracy within Islam.”14
Finally, there are Arab countries, not only the non-Arab Muslim states, that 
experimented with democracy. Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria all had relatively 
democratic constitutions during the period of French and British mandate, even if 
only on paper. Currently, most of these countries, plus Lebanon and Morocco, have 
functioning parliaments now and at least a certain degree of democracy. They 
prove that democratic procedures, like elections, can be held in the predominantly
10 L. A n d e r s o n ,  “Democracy in the Arab world: A critique of the political culture approach”, in: R. 
B ry n e n , B. K o ra n y , P. N o b le , Political l.iberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Boulder and 
London 1995, vol. 1, p. 87.
"  A. G a r n f in k le ,  “The new missionaries” , Prospect, April 2003, pp. 22-24.
12 H. S a le h , “ lraq’s futurę worries Saudis”, BBC News, May 11, 2003.
13 S. P. H u n t in g to n ,  ‘Democracy’s Third W ave’, Journal o f  Democracy 1991, no. 2, p. 28.
14 A. G a r n f in k le ,  „The new missionaries” ...
Islamie states. Moreover, among the Arab countries there is a distinctive group of 
states, which in recent years, with only few exceptions, implemented political re- 
forms, broadened political participation of citizens, liberalized the media, gave 
more rights to women, etc. Although they continue to be autocratic regimes, they 
also did more to democratize themselves that many other countries of the region. 
This paper analyzes the cases of these countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE): members of the so-called Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).
Monarchies of the Gulf
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates are 
conservative Arab monarchies. They have relatively smali populations, but abun- 
dant natural resources. The number of citizens (nationals) in these states totals al- 
most 22 million, ranging from less than 200.000 in Qatar to almost 17 million in 
Saudi Arabia.15 Huge oil and gas deposits make most of the GCC states rich and 
strategically significant for global economy. They posses about 46% of global oil 
reserves while their production capacity is in the rangę of 17-18% of that of the 
world. The GDP per capita place most GCC states among the richest countries in 
the world.
The character of the GCC regimes -  an absolute monarchy -  gives rulers 
great leeway in terms of decision-making, and placed legislative, executive and, to 
some extent, judicial power in their hands.16 What has been even more important, 
the rulers themselves have been the de facto owners of the oil-related wealth. 
Moreover, because taxes as State revenues have not been needed, governments 
have neither recognized the necessity to offer citizens much participation in the 
decision-making process, nor subjected themselves to the ordinary obligation of 
domestic accountability (the “no taxation, no representation” rule). Therefore, the 
people who populate these countries, and who are very slowly becoming citizens 
(from being just subjects before), have not in most cases been equal partners in the 
national development.
Nevertheless, people would not protest against such relations as rulers used 
to be able to meet their aspirations and fmancial expectations. Moreover, rulers 
were getting additional credits from the public as defenders of people’s faith, the 
Islam, against radical Arab nationalism, communism and Zionism.
From the Western point of view, relations between rulers of the GCC states 
and their citizens looked differently. Taking into account political rights and civil
15 The total population o f these countries is much larger, almost 35 million, ranging from some 700,000 in 
Bahrain and Qatar to over 24 million in Saudi Arabia. Yet, a large share o f the population, on average almost 40%, 
is composed of temporary foreign labor force with no citizenship rights (ranging from about 25% in Oman and 
30% in Saudi Arabia to 80% in the United Arab Emirates). See: A. K a p is z e w s k i ,  “The changing status o f Arab 
migrant workers in the GCC, Journal ofSocial Ąffairs, no. 78, Summer 2003, p.36.
16 H. H a m d a n  A l-A lk im , ‘The prospect o f democracy in the GCC countries”, Critiąue. Journal fo r  
Critical Sludies o f the Middle East, Fali 1996, pp. 29-42.
liberties, monarchies of the Gulf have not been democratic at all. They have expe- 
rienced lack of freedom, especially freedom of expression and association there, 
public participation in govemment, or democratic elections, women and certain 
minorities have been discriminated, etc. Therefore, these countries have scored 
very Iow on the highly publicized, although controversial, Freedom House democ­
racy scalę.17 Only Kuwait was rated a „partly free” country in 2002, while all other 
GCC states were considered “not free”, with Saudi Arabia joining world’s ten most 
repressive regimes (in 2003 Bahrain moved to the “partly free” category). Simi- 
larly, in the first worldwide Press Freedom Index published by “Reporters Without 
Borders” in 2002, out of 139 countries listed, the GCC countries scored Iow: Bah­
rain came 67th, Kuwait 78th, and Saudi Arabia 125th.18
Nevertheless, sińce 1991, significant political, ‘protodemocratic’ reforms 
have taken place in most of the GCC states.19 Rulers of these countries took actions 
which led towards opening of the regimes in various areas, gave citizens more to 
say in state politics and broadened people’s freedom. Discussion of the issue of 
democracy became more open.
In a context of govemance, the situation in the GCC states looked ąuite 
good in comparison to the one existing in other Arab, or even world, countries.
The Arab Humań Development Report 2002 analyzed major aspects of 
governance in the Arab world, perceived broadly as the traditions and institutions 
by which authority is exercised. They include: (1) the process by which govem- 
ments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to 
formulate effectively and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govem economic and social interactions 
among them. The Report used special aggregate indicators describing the gover- 
nance process, govemment capacity and respect for the rule of law. 0 The GCC 
states scored in most cases best results among all Arab states and in many clusters 
also quite good results in comparison with the world mean.21 In ‘political stability’
17 Freedom in the World 2002-2003, New York 2003.
Political
rights*
Civil liberties* Freedom rating**
Bahrain 5 5 Partly free
Kuwait 4 5 Partly free
Oman 6 5 Not free
Saudi Arabia 7 7 Not free
Oatar 6 6 Not free
UAE 6 5 Not free
with “ I representing the most free and ‘7 ’ the least free.
**' “Free” countries are those whose ratings average ranges from 1 to 3; “Partly free” from 3 to 5.5; and
“Not free” from 5.5 to 7.
18 http://www.rsf.fr/article.Dhn37id article=4116. Other GCC states were not evaluated.
19 G. B a h g a t ,  “The G ulf monarchies: Economic and political challenges at the end o f the century”, The 
Journal o f  Social, Political and Economic Studies 1998, no. 2, pp. 147-175; H. H a m d a n  A l-A lk im , “The 
prospects o f democracy...” .
20 D. K a u fm a n n , A. K ra a y  and P. Z o id o - L o b a to n ,  Segregating Governance Indicators and Gov- 
ernance Matters, World Bank, Research Working Papers no. 2195 and 2196, 1999.
21 Arab Humań Development Report 2002..., p. 143.
-  Qatar, Oman, the UAE and Kuwait were in four top positions in the Arab world, 
with Saudi Arabia occupying the sixth place. In ‘govemment effectiveness’ -  
Oman was on the first place, Qatar on the fourth, Bahrain on the sixth and the UAE 
on the eighth, all above the mean of the world distribution. In ‘regulatory burden’ -  
Bahrain occupied the first place, Qatar fourth, Oman fifth, the UAE sixth, all above 
average indicators. In ‘rule of law’ all the GCC states did better than average, with 
Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE occupying top four positions among Arab co­
untries. In ‘graft’, measuring the ąuality of institutions, only three Arab countries 
had scores above the average, but Kuwait and Qatar were in top two positions 
among Arab states. Only in ‘voice and accountability’ the GCC states scores Iow 
(like all Arab states for that matter); only Kuwait’s score eąualed the mean of the 
world distribution. All other failed below the mean. In The Economist’s table of 
democracy presented above, most of GCC states scored relatively well: they took 
the 5*, 6th, 7th, 10th and l l 11 positions among 18 Arab states; only Saudi Arabia 
ranked last.
The West, aware of oil importance of the region, and convinced that the 
spread of its type of democratization usually offers better guarantees for peace and 
stability, has carefully watched all occurrences in the GCC states. Neighbors of the 
Gulf monarchies and broader Arab world have also been vitally interested in the 
outcome of changes taking place there; some worry that limitation of rulers’ tradi- 
tional prerogatives can destabilize their countries and the whole region in generał 
as well as potentially bereave decline the authorities of large benefits of being in 
power; others, in tum, look for good models to reform their countries as well.
Political participation in the Gulf emirates. The historical background
The issue of political participation became debated in the Gulf emirates very early. 
There were movements in Bahrain, Dubai and Kuwait that called for the establish­
ment or institutionalization of rulers’ advisory councils in those emirates in the 
1920s and 1930s already.22 In Kuwait, a Legislative Council was established in 
1938, although the emir dissolved it just six months after its creation. Then, the 
problem of people’s representation surfaced with all its intensity with the begin- 
ning of rapid economic and social transformation related to the oil boom in the 
latter half of the 20* century. Arab immigrant workers and specialists who came to 
the Gulf countries from more “progressive” states began spreading ideas of peo- 
ple’s representation that was part of the program of the socialist and Arab nation- 
alist movements to which many of them belonged.23 In Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
the so-called Free Officers movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, largely
“ U. R a b i, “The Kuwaiti royal family in the postliberation period: Reinstitutionalizing the ‘First Among 
Equals’ system in Kuwait", in: Middle East Monarchies. The Challenge ofModernity, J. K o s t in e r  (ed.), Boulder 
and London 2000, p. 153.
2-1 See, e.g., L. G. M a r t in ,  The Unstable Gulf, Lexington and Massachusetts 1984; R. N. E l R a y y e s , 
‘Arab nationalism and the G u lf , in: B. R. P ri d h a m  (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, London 1988.
influenced by Egyptians, called for limiting the absolute authority of the monarch 
and introducing a Western style constitution.24 Such activities, which were per- 
ceived a threat to Gulf monarchies, were strongly prosecuted by local authorities. 
Nevertheless, the issue of political participation surfaced again and was debated in 
several smali Gulf countries while they were gaining independence (Kuwait in the 
early I960s, and Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1970s), 
and was to some extent addressed in the constitutions adopted by those countries.25 
Kuwait and Bahrain embarked on parliamentary experiences, establishing partially 
elected assemblies. The UAE and Qatar set up ruler-nominated consultative bodies 
but with no real legislative power or exercise of control over govemment. Oman 
followed suit establishing its State Consultative Council in 1981. Only Saudi Ara­
bia did not establish any formal structures for political participation, believing that 
rulers’ traditional type of contacts with religious and tribal leaders as well as lead- 
ing members of the business community were sufficient for that (although elections 
to the local municipality councils were held in the 1950s and 1960s).
Since the beginning of the oil-related prosperity in the GCC countries, to 
diminish the potential threat from uneąually positioned population, the autocratic 
rulers decided to share a substantial part of oil benefits with citizens in return for 
a tacit agreement not to challenge the royal families’ ultimate prerogatives. The 
increased wealth of the generał population made such arrangement possible.26 At 
the same time, just in case, rulers prepared themselves to defend their positions by 
force. Using huge oil revenues being at their disposal, they constructed large pa- 
tronage networks, built a bloated govemment bureaucracy that employs the great 
majority of working nationals, developed numerous security agencies, and brought 
organizations of ‘civil society’, which might form the basis for political challenges 
to the regimes, under strict control.
However, the ever-growing role of the State combined with expanded edu- 
cation of the citizenry, economic problems arising at certain times, discrimination 
of some groups, etc., eventually led to conflicts related to political representation as 
people began to seek a degree of control over govemments that so powerfully af- 
fected their lives.27 For example, Sunni authorities in Bahrain, concemed about the 
composition of the Bahraini parliament (which included many Shi’ites and pan- 
Arab nationalists), dissolved the assembly in 1975, just a year after its inaugura- 
tion.28 Since then, protests against the limiting of popular representation have been 
recorded in Bahrain. In Kuwait, as a result of the parliament’s freąuent criticism of 
the government decisions, the emir twice suspended it un-constitutionally, giving
24 See, e.g., J. B. K elly , Arabia, the Gulf and the West, USA, Basic Books 1980; M. A bir, Saudi Arabia. 
Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis, London 1993.
25 See, e.g., R. S a id  Z ah lan , The Making o f the Modern Gulf States. Kuwait, Bahrani, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman, Ithaca Press 1998; or K. H asan  a l-N aq e eb , Society and State in the Gulf and 
Arab Peninsula. A different Perspective, London and New York and the Centre for Arab Unity Studies 1990.
26 G. L u c ia n i (ed.), The Arab State, London 1990.
27 F. G. Ga use  III, Oil Monarchies...
28 See, e.g., A. K h a laf, Unfinislied Business-Contentious Politics and State Building in Balirain, Re­
search Reports in Sociology, Lund University 2000.
rise to pro-democratic demonstrations and prosecution of their organizers.29 In turn, 
in Saudi Arabia, clashes between the discriminated Shi’ites and govemment 
authorities occurred freąuently.30
The issue of political representation of citizens, or even the broader issue 
of democracy as such, was highlighted during the second war in the Gulf (1990- 
91). The Kuwaiti defeat and the necessity of bringing foreign (especially Ameri­
can) troops to defend the Gulf despite earlier expenditure of billions of ‘oiP dollars 
on military defense, made citizens of several Gulf countries ąuestion their govern- 
ments’ ability to protect them and demand more control over government activities. 
In such a situation, the rulers become aware of the need to reinforce the weakening 
socio-political agreement with their subjects. For example, the exiled Kuwaiti emir, 
partially discredited through his poor performance during the Iraqi invasion, held 
the unprecedented “People’s Conference”, attended by more than 1000 Kuwaitis, 
in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1990. In return for the assurance of loyalty and 
support of the Kuwaiti citizenry, the emir agreed to restore the constitution and the 
parliament suspended in 1986 upon liberation.
The war also brought other happenings. During the fighting, the authorities 
in all GCC countries broadcasted live CNN news to keep their population updated 
about the current situation. It was the first time for the people in the Gulf to be able 
to watch Western television. This opening broadened their political consciousness, 
offered them a chance of self-examination, and acquainted them with independent 
media. In the following years, another lesson for the GCC people to leam from was 
the democratization of Eastem Europę after the collapse of the communist regimes 
there.
In effect of all these developments, numerous political reforms began to 
take place in all the GCC states, either in response to pressures from the opposition, 
or as precautionary measures against possible protests from the rulers themselves.
Political developments in the GCC states sińce early 1990s
The most important occurrences for the region took place in Saudi Arabia, al- 
though not many deep reforms have been introduced there yet. Kuwait, for decades 
the most “democratized” monarchy in the Gulf, has not reformed itself much sińce 
1991 and was overtaken by Bahrain and Qatar -  two smallest emirates which, un- 
der their young new rulers, went through significant political changes in the last 
few years, opening and liberalizing their regimes. Oman, under the leadership of 
Sułtan Qaboos for more than the last thirty years, has slowly but consequently 
broadened political representation in the country. Only in the United Arab Emir­
ates, due to the country’s stability, wealth, and population structure there have been 
hardly any noteworthy political actions in the last three decades. Political move-
29 M. A. T e t r e a u l t ,  Stories o f Democracy. Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait, New York 
2000, p. 70-71.
30 M. A b ir , Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era. Reginie and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration, London 1988.
ments, important undertakings and debated and introduced reforms in each GCC 
state are presented and analyzed below.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is one of the most conservative monarchies in the world, and, ac­
cording to Western standards, a very authoritarian regime. The King rules by de- 
crees. There is no constitution to regulate affairs of the country, as it is believed 
that Sharia determines all aspects of not only private but also public life. Political 
parties, trade unions, collective bargaining, strikes, and public demonstrations are 
prohibited. Freedom of expression is severely restricted, in particular by prohibi- 
tions of criticism of Islam and the ruling family. Women are denied many basie 
rights and segregated. Judicial independence is undermined by the influence of the 
royal family and its associates. In generał, the Saudi political system constitutes the 
most complete expression of so-called ‘Islamie exception’, the generał rejection of 
the Western system of law and support for the view that all legitimacy should come 
from the Koran and the Sunna.
The country was established and has been ruled sińce 1744 by the al-Saud 
family in cooperation with the religious authorities of the movement following the 
strict Hanbali doctrine of Islam, in the West called the Wahhabis after the founder 
of the movement.31 In some matters, the King has complete authority, although he 
would never dare to make a decision against the religious establishment. In other 
matters, the ulama can be critical of the rulers, but in no way to suggest they might 
want to see them overthrown. Often, the king asks ulama for the approval of deci- 
sions, which could be perceived as un-Islamic, before taking them.32 What has 
weakened the religious appeal of the regime, is the close cooperation between the 
rulers and the “Satanic West”, mainly on the matters of security and economy 
(protection of the monarchy by the Western powers against regional threats to 
guarantee free flow of oil and gas to the West), which, however, brings about 
a significant Western presence in the Kingdom. What has been mostly criticized by 
the ulama is the ‘decadent’, Western life-style of the ruling elites. To counterbal- 
ance these claims, to stress the religious aspect of ruler’s legitimization to power, 
King Fahd bin Abdel Aziz started to use the title of the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosąues (in Mecca and Medina).
Despite maintaining a very conservative, Islamie identity, Saudi Arabia 
sińce the beginning of the 1990s, has witnessed political activity that, while not 
directly ąuestioning the religious base of the country’s identity and legitimacy of 
the rulers, has called for changes in the manner of state govemance.
First, in December 1990, a group of 43 ‘liberals’ and ‘secularists’ (aca- 
demics, writers, businessmen, and govemment officials) circulated a petition in 
which they appealed to King Fahd for introduction of basie laws regulating the
3IM .A 1 -R a h e e d , A History o f Saudi Arabia, Cambridge 2002.
32 P. La w s on , SAIS Review: Saudi Arabia, Internet dialogue, June 2002.
functioning of govemment, and for the strengthening of the principle of eąuality of 
all citizens, as well as for the elimination of discrimination based on religion, tribal 
affiliation, family background and social status. The signatories of the petition 
criticized the functioning of the legał system and members of the royal family in- 
terfering with it. The petitioners urged the King to establish the long-proposed 
Consultative Council and provide it with a broad rangę of powers, including the 
right to oversee the work of executive agencies.33 They also advocated the estab­
lishment of consultative councils in Saudi provinces, more independence to the 
media, and the introduction of a framework of regulations for issuing fatwa, relig- 
ious edicts on various issues, which, as they suggested, contrary to the existing 
tradition, should be subject to ‘assessment, evaluation, discussion, and response 
without limit or restriction’.
In turn, in May 1991, over 400 hundred Islamists, including the leading 
ulama, presented to the King a memorandum demanding extensive reform of the 
political and judicial system and calling for strict application of Islamie norms and 
values in public life as well as in economic and foreign policy issues. It criticized 
the corruption of govemment officials and called for consideration to be given to 
ąualifications and merit rather than to kinship in the process of appointing the gov- 
emment. It also stressed that the planned Consultative Council should be com- 
pletely independent and should be vested with broad powers. Moreover, the memo­
randum called for the development of a strong army and for a ‘national’ foreign 
policy, not based on foreign alliances with non-Islamic countries.
The very fact of petitions and memorandums, the never before used means 
of communication with the King, was a sign of serious tensions in the country. 
Therefore, on March 1, 1992, King Fahd decided to take some actions to calm 
down the situation. He decreed the long-promised Basic Laws -  a constitution-like 
document, the statute for a new consultative council, and a system of regional gov- 
emment for the kingdom’s 14 provinces.
The most important decision taken was that on the Consultative Council, 
established as a debating assembly consisting of 60 members appointed by the 
King.34 The Council was to study all govemment regulations, treaties and intema- 
tional accords before they are promulgated through royal decree, as well as to de- 
liberate upon and evaluate economic and social development programs. It was also 
to discuss annual reports submitted by ministers and state-owned organizations and 
present recommendations, and was empowered to question the cabinet members. 
The Council cannot, however, initiate debates on issues: it either has to obtain 
permission from the King to do so or await submission from the govemment. The 
King retained the power to dissolve or reorganize the Council at will.
The introduction of the Basic Law and the decision to establish the Consulta- 
tive Council did not satisfy the opposition and calls for political reforms did not stop.
33 F. G. G a u s e  III, Oil Monarchies..., pp. 94-97 and G. K ra m e r , “Good counsel to the King: The Is- 
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34 S. J a h e 1, “A Parliament According to Sharia”, Arabies Trends, April 1998, pp. 26-31.
In May 1993, several prominent Islamist scholars and academics estab- 
lished the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, the first ever opposi­
tion organization in the Kingdom openly challenging the monarchy, accusing the 
govemment and senior ulama for not doing enough ‘to protect the legitimate Is­
lamie rights of the Muslims’, including political participation. Government 
authorities disbanded the Committee within two weeks, fired its founders from the 
state-paid positions and arrested its spokesman. Nevertheless, for the next few 
years the Committee members managed to ąuestion the very foundation of the 
regime: the contract between rulers and the religious establishment, and criticize 
the behavior and decisions taken by Saudi authorities, and King Fahd in particular. 
For that purpose they skillfully used the new media (faxes and Internet), first from 
within the Kingdom and later from the exile in London.35
Then the Shi’ite leaders also wrote a petition to the King, in which they 
strongly supported the establishment of a consultative council. At the same time, 
they demanded the discontinuation of discrimination against Shi’ites in the coun­
try, especially in the labor market, universities and the army, as well as the cessa- 
tion of the harassment they faced while performing their religious functions 
(Shi’ites are approximately 10 per cent of the Kingdom’ s population).
Although these petitions brought no immediate results, the sole idea of 
formulating demands in writing and presenting them to the King established a new, 
important precedent in the country.
The Consultative Council finally set to work in mid-1990s and ąuickly es­
tablished itself within Saudi political system. This is why, in 1997, the Council was 
enlarged from 60 to 90 members, and the King included three Shi’ite Muslims 
among the appointed members. In May 2001, the Council was expanded again to 
120 members. Members of the Council were chosen from among the country’s 
regions and important constituent groups: religious establishment, government 
bureaucracy and the business community, followers of both conservative and lib­
erał ideologies. They have usually been highly-educated and experienced people, 
considered experts in their respective fields (academics, retired senior officers, ex- 
civil servants and private businessmen), asked to perform the Islamie function of 
shura, meaning provision of counsel. Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Joubayr, 
a respected Hanbali jurist and former Minister of Justice became the President of 
the first State Council and of successive ones. The influence of the Council, not 
grounded in law, has been a function of its members prominence and diversity. It also 
reflects the tradition of govemance, which “prizes consensus, strives to maintain har- 
mony through consultation and is deeply averse to conflict”.36 While the verdicts of the 
Council are neither binding on the King, nor on the govemment, usually either the 
ministers accept the recommendations of the Council or the two parties reach a com- 
promise.
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Further changes in the Saudi political scene have taken place sińce Crown 
Prince Abdullah became de facto ruler in the late 1990s due to the deteriorating 
health of King Fahd. Abdullah has been perceived as a more pragmatic leader than 
many other, top-positioned members of the ruling family, the man who well under- 
stands challenges facing the Kingdom in modem times. He began to enact reforms 
to offset economic problems, budgetary deficit and unemployment. He also started 
to work carefully to defuse the biggest potential threat to al-Saud’s legitimacy: 
educated middle-class Islamists, who for years, with the increased intensity, have 
loudly been denouncing corruption and demanding a change in the country. For 
that purpose, he released several radical Sunni fundamentalist prisoners, hoping to 
calm down existing tensions.
Despite these actions, in July 1999, a new ‘Memorandum of Advice’ was 
prepared and signed by a large group of more than a hundred lower-level ulama, 
including many members of faculties at Islamie colleges and universities, and sent 
to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, the head of the Council of Senior Scholars and 
Secretary General (with the ministerial rank) of the Administration of Religious 
Studies, Legał Opinion, Mission and Guidance.37 The memorandum repeated many 
themes from the earlier petitions, such as the criticism of corruption, nepotism and 
favoritism, lack of respect of individual rights, the denial of freedom of expression 
(for Islamie preachers, teachers and activists) and close cooperation and depend- 
ence on Western powers. It reąuested independent judiciary system and establish­
ment of a consultative council. At the same time the memorandum called for strict 
application of the Sharia, the abolition of all un-Islamic laws and revision of trea- 
ties with non-MusIim states and institutions. The signatories complained that the 
ulama were not being consulted by state authorities in crucial economic, political 
and military matters and demanded that more power be given to them. In generał, 
the memorandum reąuested the creation of purely Islamie state.
The attacks on the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon with 
hijacked planes on September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on Saudi political 
scene. Out of 19 hijackers, 15 were Saudis. Then, it occurred that majority of the 
al-Qaeda soldiers, arrested in Afghanistan and brought to Quantanamo base were 
Saudis. Osama bin Laden used to be a Saudi citizen and his organization was sup- 
ported by contributions from Saudis. Thus, many people in the West started to 
believe that Saudis “waged war” against them, that they were “financing the spread 
of the idea that free societies must be overthrown and totalitarian Wahhabi Islam 
must be imposed by force”.38 “The country’s rulers, its religious beliefs, social 
customs and educational curricula became targets of endless hostile commentary. 
The Kingdom came to be portrayed as a breeding ground for terrorism, an anach- 
ronistic, baekward country that... teaching its children to hate the West.”39 In such 
an atmosphere, in November 2003, members of the U.S. Congress introduced even
37 J. K o s t in e r  and J. T e i te lb a u m , “State-formation and the Saudi monarchy”, in: J. K o s tin e r ,  Mid- 
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38 M. B a ro n e , “Our enemies the Saudis” , U.S. News and World Report, March 6, 2002.
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the draft of the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act, which would impose sanctions on 
the Kingdom unless the U.S. President certified that Riyadh continued to make 
maximum effort to fight terrorism. (The legislation eventually went on voting as an 
amendment to the foreign aid bill reąuesting to add Saudi Arabia to the list of 
countries which “has funded terrorists and fostered hatred of the West”, and was 
rejected, 231-191 as the State Department declared that Saudi Arabia has taken 
actions to disrupt domestic al-Qaeda cells and improved anti-terrorist cooperation 
with the U.S.) At the same time President Bush announced the new American pol­
icy towards the region, admitting that 60 years of supporting dictatorships in the 
region had not made Americans safe.40 In the carefully chosen words he encour- 
aged political reforms in the Kingdom, saying that “by giving the Saudi people 
a greater role in their own society, the Saudi govemment can demonstrate true 
leadership in the region”. In another speech he added, with an obvious reference to 
Saudi Arabia, that “suppressing dissent only increases radicalism”.41
Accusations of supporting terrorism as well as the U.S. pressure to reform 
their system infuriated many Saudis. Many accused the West, the U.S. in particu- 
lar, of staging a propaganda war against them. As their anger could easily turn 
against Saudi authorities closely cooperating with the US govemment on various 
issues, Prince Abdullah met with the ulama and warned them against staging any 
campaign on the matter. At the same time, in the wake of a possible Western inter- 
vention in Iraq in 2003, the action aimed to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime with 
a democratic govemment, Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Abdullah called for reforms 
in the Arab states. He stated that “internal reform and enhanced political participa­
tion are essential steps for the building of Arab capabilities and for providing the 
conditions for a comprehensive awakening and development of Arab human re-
yy 42sources .
The reform-oriented groups in the Kingdom decided to use the situation to 
intensify the pressure for political, social and educational reforms. In 2003, they 
submitted several petitions to the King calling for change.
The first one, called “A Vision for the Present and the Futurę of the Na- 
tion”, was prepared in January, among others by Abdullah al-Hamed, an Islamist 
from Riyadh, Mohamed Said Tayyeb, a liberał lawyer from Jeddah and Jaafar al- 
Shayeb, a Shi’ite activist. It was signed by 104 academics, businessmen, religious 
scholars and professionals from various regions and representing different religious 
and political orientations.43 Staying within the framework of Sharia, the signatories 
called for the convening of an “open national conference” to discuss existing 
problems, providing the Consultative Council with legislative and control powers 
and made it an elected body, as well as for an independent judiciary, freedom of 
expression and the establishment of civil society institutions. They also reąuested
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fair distribution of wealth among different regions and introducing measures to 
fight corruption, bribery and the abuse of official powers. The petition, despite its 
non-confrontational tone and respectful language towards the monarchy, essen- 
tially suggested the establishment of institutions to curb the power of the ruling 
family and guarantee popular participation in decision-making, replacing a system 
with ruler’s absolute power with the constitutional monarchy in which power is 
shared with elected representatiyes.44
The end of April witnessed the second petition, prepared in tum by the 
Shi’ite community and signed by 450 men and women. It was entitled “Partners in 
One Nation” to reaffirm the Shi’ite loyalty to the state (often ąuestioned by radical 
Sunni Islamists). It followed the spirit of the January petition but urged govemment 
particularly to end the discrimination of Shi’ites in employment and allow them to 
practice their religious rites.45 Moreover, the petition appealed to put an end to 
“fanatical sectarian tendencies stimulating hatred”, unlawful arrests, the depriva- 
tion of the right to travel, etc., as well as a public announcement by country’s lead- 
ers to respect Shi’ite rights and equality with other citizens. (Shi’ites are often per- 
ceived by Wahhabi religious establishment as infidels and their veneration of saints 
and shrines, celebration of the prophet Mohammed’s birthday and other rituals as 
sinful).
The Shi’ite petition should be understood in the context of sectarian ten- 
sions, which heightened in Saudi Arabia after the beginning of the Iraqi war. What 
has happened across the border has an impact on the situation in Saudi Arabia (as 
well as in other countries with major Shi’ite populations, i.e. Kuwait and Bahrain). 
Clashes between Shi’ites and U.S. troops in Iraq have inspired feelings of solidarity 
there, while the vision of a futurę Shi’ite-led govemment in Baghdad made some peo­
ple anxious, as such a development could strengthen demands for far-reaching political 
reforms in Bahrain or in Shi’ite-dominated Eastem provinces of Saudi Arabia. Just 
before the Iraqi war, on February 3, 2003, an article in the Wall Street Journal, subse- 
quently translated into Arabie and reprinted in the region, suggested that the Shi’ite in 
Al-Hasa region would be willing to separating from the Kingdom, seeking to re- 
establish their state in that part of the Peninsula. That was accompanied by rumors that 
“liberating” the Eastem Province in such a way had in fact become official US policy.46 
To calm down tensions, Prince Abdullah met with the Shi’ite reform group and listened 
to their complaints, while the nation’s most senior religious leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz 
bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, declared that accusation of other Muslims, who may obey dif­
ferent doctrine, of being disbelievers is not permitted under Islam and such an approach 
“results in murdering innocent people, destroying facilities, disorder, and instability”.47
The lack of visible results of the January petition prompted new appeals. In 
September 2003, more than 300 Saudis, including at this time 50 women, Sunnis 
and Shi’ ites from all parts of the Kingdom, signed a petition entitled “In Defense of
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the Nation”. In it they basically repeated the demands from the previous petition 
but in the view of the emergence of terrorist activity in the Kingdom, openly 
blamed the existing political restrictions for its development. “Being late in adopt- 
ing radical reforms and ignoring popular participation in decision-making have 
been the main reasons that helped the fact that our country reached this dangerous 
tum, and this is why we believe that denying the natural rights of the political, 
cultural and intellectual society to express its opinions has led to the dominance of 
a certain way of thinking that is unable to dialogue with others... which is what 
helped create the terrorist and judgmental mind that our country is still plagues 
with.”48 Moreover, the signatories of the petition criticized “unilateral and judg­
mental thinking, pretending to hołd and monopolize the truth” and called for 
“nurturing a pluralistic atmosphere that paves the way...towards the acceptance of 
the different.”
The Saudi govemment, to improve its image, organized in October, 2003, 
the intemational human rights conference, first of its kind in the Kingdom. During 
the conference, on a cali from the dissident, London-based Movement for Islamie 
Reform in Arabia, hundred of Saudis, men and women, took on the streets of Riy- 
adh in the first in decades large-scale protest in the country. From the authorities 
they demanded political, economic, and administrative reforms. Saudi police fired 
waming shots, used tear gas and arrested many demonstrators. Next week, only 
a heavy police presence thwarted further demonstrations in several cities. As the 
follow-up of the conference, the ąuasi-independent National Human Rights Orga- 
nization was established in March 2004. It was composed of 41 małe and female 
members, headed by Abdullah ibn Saleh Al-Obaid, former secretary-general of the 
Muslim World League and member of the Consultative Council. It is supposed to 
monitor the human rights situation in the Kingdom, including rights violation aga-
49mst women.
As many reformers who signed the January petition decided not to sign the 
September one as too liberał and anti-Islamic, another petition was prepared in 
December, this time again jointly by a diversified group of Islamists, liberals and 
Shi’ites. It was titled “An Appeal to the Leadership and the People: Constitutional 
Reform First”. Calling for the implementation of the reforms outlined in the Janu­
ary petition, the signatories this time went further, demanding adoption of the con- 
stitution, which would construct “a modem Arab Islamie state”.50
In meantime Prince Abdullah called three “National Dialogue” sessions. 
They were of major importance. The first one, held in Riyadh in June 2003, gath- 
ered religious leaders from various Islamie currents and sects: ulama from the offi- 
cial religious establishment, popular salafi preachers51, Shi’ites and Sufis. The 
presence of the last two was of a particular note, as they are not considered brothers 
in faith by the dominant Wahhabis. The meeting was probably aimed at bringing
48 w w w .arabrenewal.com. Translation by Gwenn Okhrulik and Yara Youssef.
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some Sunni-Shi’ite understanding, the issue of special significance in times of 
change in neighboring Iraq, where Shi’ites were growing in power.52
The second session took place in Mecca in December 2003. Entitled 
“Extremism and Moderation, a Comprehensive View”, it gathered 60 intellectuals, 
clerics and businesspeople, including 10 women (seated in a different room). 
Problems with the rise of Islamie militancy were openly discussed at the meeting 
as well as various political, social and educational issues. The meeting ended in the 
formulation of 18 recommendations which were later formally presented to Prince 
Abdullah. They included holding elections for the Consultative Council and local 
consultative councils, encouraging establishment of trade unions, voluntary asso- 
ciations and other civil society institutions, separating the legislative, executive and 
judiciary powers, developing new school curricula promoting spirit of tolerance, 
dialogue and moderation as well as broadening freedom of expression.53
The third “National Dialogue” session was held in Medina in June 2004 
and was devoted to “Rights and Duties of Women”. Although every other of the 70 
participants was a woman, the meeting was dominated by conservative men. In 
effect, controversial topics, like lifting the ban on women drivers, or allowing them 
to travel without a małe guardian, were avoided. This was also why, a delegation of 
women went separately to see Prince Abdullah and submitted to him an altemative 
set of specific recommendations, which he promised to consider.54 It is worth not- 
ing that a few days before the session, a group of nearly 130 religious scholars 
issued a joint statement asserting that total eąuality between men and women 
would contravene Islam. The statement also criticized several Saudi newspapers 
for being “proponents of Westemization” in relation to women.55
Although in Saudi Arabia’s political and cultural environment organizing such 
sessions was a defmitive opening on behalf of the authorities to a dialogue with the 
opposition, their impact should not be overestimated. They were govemment- 
sponsored and controlled events, and recommendations adopted by the participants are 
unlikely to be implemented soon, if at all. Some even believe that the sessions “were 
essentially gimmicks meant to co-opt critics and project a more acceptable face of the 
regime to both domestic and intemational audiences”.56 In February 2004, 880 partici­
pants in the “National Dialogue” meetings along with the petition-writers, frustrated with 
lack of any signs of reforms, sent Prince Abdullah a letter urging him to announce 
a timetable for the implementation of the recommendations adopted at the second ses­
sion.57 Nevertheless, organizing the “National Dialogue” sessions was not the only 
reaction from the authorities to petitions. In generał, the reaction was mixed.
On the one hand, the govemment, allowed Saudi dissidents to speak more 
openly in public ‘to let off the steam’, and let newspapers publish articles criticiz-
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ing govemment (though no criticism of the royal family or publication of the texts 
of petitions was allowed). One of the prominent Islamist dissidents, Ahmad al- 
Tuweijeri, received an appointment to the Consultative Council. Many others have 
been rewarded with audiences with members of the royal family to air their gripes. 
Then, what was seen as a remarkable gesture, the Crown Prince Abdullah met with 
a whole group of signatories of the January petition to discuss their demands and 
later included some of them in the govemment-sponsored “National Dialogue” 
debates. Moreover, the government took a decision to organize elections, choosing 
the least important and risky, namely, elections to municipal councils. The high- 
ranking officials for the first time adopted the expression “expanding political par­
ticipation”. Prince Abdullah stated in his address to the Consultative Council that 
“municipal elections will be the beginning of the Saudi citizens’ participation in the 
political system”, while the Foreign Minister, prince Saud Al-Faisal, similarly re- 
marked that Saudi Arabia “has reached a stage in our development that reąuires 
expanding political participations”. In tum, Prince Turki al-Faisal said that “reforming 
the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity”.58 Such vocabulary used to be taboo 
among the ruling family.59
In this liberalized mode, the issue of elections became widely discussed 
throughout the Kingdom. As Islamist reformer, Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim stated: “It is 
hard to overestimate the importance of this step in a society where non-interference 
in politics is considered the condition of good citizenship.”60 Prince Sułtan bin 
Abdel Aziz, the minister of defense and a key figurę in a ruling family told the 
Consultative Council, that the country leadership agrees with demands that this 
body should be developed and given further powers, to ‘monitor’ and ‘supervise’ 
the govemment in particular. Later on, however, Prince Sułtan announced that the 
country was not ready for elections yet.61 Most of Saudi officials, have continued to 
be afraid of such a move. They believe that this would pose too great a risk to sta- 
bility of the country and strengthen the hand of radical Islamists. According to 
some of them “because conformity to strict religious dogma remains the principal 
criterion for judging matters public and private ... political debates could poten- 
tially tum into religious clashes”, while “the culture of democracy accepts the plu- 
ralism of opinions and relativity in all things. How can you reconcile relativity with 
a society that is govemed by religion?” and “democracy right now will produce 
something very similar to the Taliban”.62
With such thoughts in mind, the govemment decided to go ahead only with 
elections to municipal councils (following a well tested pattem in neighboring Bah­
rain and Qatar). In October 2003 it was announced that they will be held within the 
next twelve months. Eventually, in August 2004, it was decided that, first, only half 
of the seats will be filled in this way (the remaining are expected to be made of
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nominated incumbents with the experience to assists the new members), second, 
that elections in 178 municipalities will be held in three phases: in mid-November, 
after Ramadan, in Riyadh, and before and after hajj in other parts of the country, 
ending in January 2005. That approach was for the authorities to take a step and 
evaluate the impact of elections before proceeding to the next phase. It can be ex- 
pected that once this is seen to work, the next elections will be for the whole mu- 
nicipal councils, then for regional councils, and eventually for the Consultative 
Council.
In addition to that, the royal decree of November 29, 2003, enhanced also 
the Consultative Council rights to act as a partly legislative as opposed to purely 
advisory body. In particular, individual members were granted authority to propose 
new legislation and to have more power in disputes with the cabinet. At the same 
time, it was decided to begin, for the first time, televised coverage of the weekly 
sessions of the Consultative Council. That became an interesting development, as 
Saudis have a traditional aversion to public debate, preferring instead deciding 
matters behind the closed doors.
Some reforms were introduced also to the judiciary. A new bill regulating 
the rights of defendants and suspects before courts and police came into effect, in 
particular allowing lawyers to present arguments in criminal courts. In February 
2004, the international organization -  Humań Rights Watch, was granted access to 
the Saudi judicial system, including its prisons.
Steps were also taken to change the situation of women. In the year 2000, 
Saudi Arabia finally ratified the UN convention on elimination of all forms of di- 
scrimination against women. Thanks to the efforts of Prince Abdullah, women 
were for the first time allowed to present their grievances to the Consultative Co­
uncil, in particular complaints about their marital status and dowries. A female 
member of the royal family was appointed Undersecretary at the Ministry of Edu- 
cation -  the highest position ever held by a Saudi woman. The govemment began 
issuing identity cards to women thus allowing them to be listed as citizens rather 
than dependents on husband’s or father’s cards. Responding to long-time popular 
pressure for reform of the neglected female education, the control of the General 
Presidency for Girl’s Education, run by the religious establishment before, was 
transferred to the govemment’s Ministry of Education, which added prestige and 
fmancial capacities to the education of girls. Finally, in May 2003, the Council of 
Ministers issued a decree allowing women to obtain commercial licenses in their 
own names, without the need for a małe guardian permission. At the same time, the 
document appealed to govemment departments and Chamber of Commerce to cre- 
ate more jobs for women. That was especially important as, according to official 
figures, only about 5 per cent of Saudi working age women were employed.
On the other hand, conservative forces continue to oppose any changes in the 
status of women. For example, Saleh bin Humaid, speaker of the Shura Council, stated 
that talk about women members of the Consultative Council “was premature”.63
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On January 17, 2004, there was an interesting incident at the Jeddah Eco­
nomic Forum, attended by such personalities as Bill Clinton. The keynote address 
was given by Lubna Olayan, a leading Saudi business woman, connected to the 
ruling family. She was introduced by Prince Mohammed Al Faisal, the grandson of 
King Faisal. Women attending the Forum were separated from their małe col- 
leagues by a partition only (i.e. not segregated into a separate room). Pictures of 
Olayan’s unveiled face appeared next day in some Saudi newspapers, making her 
the first Saudi women appearing in such a way in the media.64 In reaction to that 
incident, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom leading religious official 
appointed by the govemment, strongly condemned such a behavior. Yet at the 
same time, Akbaria, an all-news Saudi TV channel began featuring three non- 
muhajaba women anchors, and Okaz, a popular Saudi daily ran a photo of them. 
Another cultural border was crossed.
All of these, in the Saudi context, were significant moves. But altogether 
the issue is so emotional and symbolic, and always ready to mobilize wide opposi- 
tion that the govemment cannot go much further with granting women more 
rights.65
The Saudi press, to a great extent privately owned, continues to play an in- 
creasingly important role in the political discourse. “While refraining from either 
publishing or discussing any of the reform petitions, they opened their columns to 
unprecedented criticism of [...] such matters as education (accused of inadequacy 
as well as of inculcating extremism), poverty, unemployment, drug use, the mis- 
treatment of foreign workers and more generally problems confronting the younger 
generations. Some opinion writers have called into ąuestion elements of the 
Wahhabi discourse, suggesting a link between certain attitudes promoted by the 
religious establishment and the rise of violent extremism.”66 A good example of the 
openness of newspapers is a commentary written on the first anniversary of the 
September 11 attacks by Rasheed Abu-Alsamh in the Arab News:
First, we must stop denying that any of the hijackers were Saudis or even 
Arab. We must also stop saying that the September 11 attacks were a CIA-Zionist 
plot to make the Arabs and Islam look bad. That is utter nonsense. We must be 
maturę and responsible enough to admit that these sick minds that hatched and 
perpetrated these dastardly attacks, were, sadly, a product of a twisted viewpoint of 
our society and our religion ... We must stop the hatred being taught to our chil- 
dren in schools.
Since the suicide bombings of Western residential compound in Riyadh on 
May 12, 2003, in which 35 people died, newspapers have run a series of unusually 
bold editorials on the problems of Saudi society.67 The extraordinary article was 
published by Prince Bandar bin Sułtan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, in Al-
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Watan, on June 1, 2004. The Prince recognized the Saudi effort against terrorism as 
‘feeble’, and went on saying that terrorism “has nothing to do with America or 
Israel or the Christians or Jews... So let us stop these meaningless justifications for 
what those criminals are doing and let stop blaming others while the problem 
comes from within us.” Elsewhere in the article he noted that the Kingdom’s re­
ligious scholars “have to declare jihad against those deviants and to fully support it, 
as those who keep silent about the truth are mute devils.” The Saudi-owned, but 
London-based, Asharą al-Awsat followed the line of that argument. Turki al- 
Hamad wrote in it: “the official clergy in Saudi Arabia denounce violence, but 
theoretical base of Wahhabism is a problem. It is not enhancing or encouraging 
violence directly, but if you analyze the creed itself, you will reach these results.”68
But it is difficult to find much support for such ideas in the Kingdom. The 
reality has been different. “The attempt to expose and uproot the ideological and 
theocratic influences used to justify terrorist attacks were suppressed by the relig­
ious establishment, [the same] which helped the Saud family consolidate its rule 
when the Kingdom was founded more than 70 years ago”.69 The religious estab­
lishment and those members of the ruling elite who follow their guidance promote 
a different viewpoint. According to them, “the perpetrators of these heinous crimes 
are influenced by ideologies alien to our country and to the naturę of our people, 
who throughout the ages advocated tolerance and coherence.” Prince Mohammed 
bin Fahd, govemor of the Eastem Province and the son of King Fahd, was quoted 
as saying after the Khobar attacks: ‘Those militants are the outcome of Guan- 
tanamo, Abu Gharib, Sharon and the American policy of the region; they are angry 
against anything foreign and want to retaliate against anything foreign”. For Muh- 
sen Awaji, a prominent Islamist lawyer, “it was not Wahhabism which produced 
them, they were the other circumstances in the region.”70 Such views are prevailing 
among the Saudis. Most of them greatly resent the implication that their religion 
has any connection to terrorism.
Under such circumstances, broadening the freedom of the press was, of 
course, possible only because its criticism of certain matters, especially extremism, 
coincided with the official viewpoints. With the un-written boundaries violated, 
journalists continued to pay a heavy price. For example, a well-known editor of Al­
ty/atan was dismissed in May 2003 after the newspaper aroused the religious estab­
lishment by publishing a series of articles critical of the clerics.
Altogether, the press scored certain victories in recent years. In March 
2002, press criticism of behavior of the head of religious institutions in charge of 
girls’ education forced him to resign, the first such case in the history of the King­
dom, after the scandal surrounding the death of 15 schoolgirls in a fire in Mecca. In 
2004, journalists obtained important concession from the govemment, which ap- 
proved the establishment of a long-sought Saudi Journalists’ Association, an or- 
ganization aimed to protect the rights of reporters.
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All the events mentioned above are political in naturę and could happen 
only because of the demands of the opposition and willingness of the authorities to 
introduce certain changes. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the govemment, the 
ruling family, or at least a large part of it, was content with these happenings. They 
totally opposed such proposals as independence of the judiciary, redistribution of 
wealth or transparency of public finances, as reforms in these areas would seriously 
jeopardize their socio-economic position in the country.71 Prince Nayef, the Min­
ister of Interior, when asked about the January petition remarked: “no to change, 
yes to development”.72 “Change means changing something that already exists. 
Whatever exists in the Kingdom is already well-established; however, there is 
a scope for development -  development that does not clash with the principles of 
the nation.” With such opinion common in the govemment, it became obvious 
thatat certain moment the authorities must restrict actions of the reformers. It hap- 
pened in December 2003, when Prince Nayef summoned a group of opposition 
figures and threatened them with arrest if they continued their activities.73 A few 
weeks later, Crown Prince Abdullah, usually perceived as more open and prag- 
matic person in the ruling family than the others, also wamed the reformers: “ ...the 
state will not allow anybody to destroy national unity or disturb the peace of its 
people under the pretext of reforms ... We will not leave the security of the nation 
and the futurę of its people to the mercy of opportunists, who start with provoca- 
tion and end with arbitrary demands.”74 Finally, in March 2004, the authorities 
arrested several pro-reform activists, including al-Hamed and Tayyeb, and asked 
them to sign pledges that they would cease their activism.
The govemment does not have much flexibility in terms of reforms, even if 
one assume that it is interested in them at all. As it is engaged in a fight against 
extremists who accuse it of deviation from the path of Islam, the regime cannot 
afford to jeopardize his relations with religious forces that also oppose violence, 
justify its legitimacy and are supported by the majority of conservative Saudi soci­
ety. And these forces are strongly against certain reforms, a dialogue with various 
groups and elections in particular. The domestic pro-reform movement and exter- 
nal pressures seem not to be strong enough to enforce far-reaching changes, espe- 
cially in times of terrorist attacks in the Kingdom. The age of the rulers and prob­
lems with succession additionally limit the potential for change. Therefore, what 
can be expected consists only of cautious steps toward reforms, while occasionally 
cracking down on reformers. The only phenomenon which can speed up the proc­
ess is the Saudi changing society. In probably the first, relatively independent 
opinion pool on the matter conducted in the latter half of 2003, 85 per cent of re-
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spondents thought that political reform would be beneficial for the country, 90 per 
cent wanted to grant more rights to women, and fewer than 59 per cent supported 
the official clergy.75 Unemployment was the most pressing concem for respondents 
(80 per cent), while political reforms, corruption, education, or religious extremism 
did not exceed 10 per cent. Somewhat contradictory, only 12 per cent of respon­
dents had a positive view of liberał reformers, probably because they associated 
them only with the writing of inefficient petitions.
It is also worthwhile to point out that, at least to some extent, the issue of 
reforms in Saudi Arabia is not so much between those who want them and those 
who do not. A growing number of people, including some members of the ruling 
family and the religious establishment, probably favors changes in the face of rapid 
modemization of the country and its population growth. The problem hinges on the 
kind of reforms that different groups want. Here, the key issue (and disagreement) 
are the relations between reforms and secular modemity. A large part of the Saudi 
religious establishment, in the tradition of the conservative reformist, Sheikh Mu- 
hammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, believes that modemization comes only at the cost of 
secularization and for that reason must be rejected. Some reformers believe ho- 
wever, that it is possible to have modemization without secularization and therefo- 
re cali for enhancing political participation, greater transparency, rights for women, 
etc., at the same time claiming that it can be done within the framework of their 
conservative, Islamie values. Yet, as nobody talks about secularization of the pu­
blic life, Western type of political reforms are very unlikely. Pessimists go even 
further. “No matter what happens in Saudi Arabia, whether the insurgents actually 
unseat the ruling family, or the Sauds manage to accommodate the militants, there 
will be no ‘liberał reform’ in the Kingdom for a long time”, wrote Lee Smith.76 “In 
all likelihood, that country is going to become even more conservative.”
It is difficult for the royal family to move against the Islamists. After the 
Islamie militants took over the Grand Mosąue in Mecca in 1979 and held hundreds 
of pilgrims hostage, the authorities, to avoid similar occurrences in futurę, decided 
to accommodate the Islamists. “The royal family handed over education, the courts 
and cultural affairs to the imams. Many of the rigid features of modem Saudi life: 
no women on television, no musie in any media, an overdose of religion in schools, 
stores closed during prayer times, inereased powers for the religious police were 
passed in the early 1980s.”77 Now the authorities are afraid that if they take on the 
religious establishment, “the imams will stop preaching about infidels and start 
talking about royal family decadence”.
The radical Islamists are generally against reforms. They are afraid that re­
forms may de-Islamize the Kingdom. A good example of that attitude was a statement 
released by 156 Salafi scholars and judges in December 2003, protesting the educa- 
tional reform, meaning mostly a deletion of materiał offensive to Christian and Jews.
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They accused the govemment of capitulating to American pressure on the matter and 
called teachers and parents to oppose the new curriculum.
On the other hand, there is an agreement between moderate Islamists and 
secular modernists that what Saudi Arabia needs are some political, economic and 
social reforms. According to these factions, these could “head off the collision 
between the two extremes -  Bin Laden’s Islam and George Bush’s America -  that 
could ultimately destroy it”.78 The trouble is that the terrorist attacks in the King­
dom make significant reforms unlikely, because the terrified regime is afraid to 
make any moves which potentially could destabilize the situation even further. On 
the other hand, terror make reforms more necessary, because it has been causing 
exodus of the now dramatically targeted foreign nationals, which results in the 
drying up of foreign investment, and in conseąuence worsening of the socio- 
economic situation, which in tum helps to breed the militants.
What also weakens the chances for substantial reforms is that those who 
stand for them are mostly intellectuals and academics -  not a strong political force 
in the Saudi society. The business community at large is not generally against re­
forms, which, if implemented, can give it a greater say in the economy of the liber- 
alized country. At the same time, however, businessmen are often unwilling to get 
actively involved in the reform movement because of their dependence of the gov- 
ernment and risk of losing the already possessed privileges.
Commenting on the Saudi reform movement, Khalid Al-Dakhil stressed 
that unlike the opposition of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the ‘new liberals’ declare 
that the Saudi monarchy is legitimate and reflective of the social, religious and 
political reality and the history of the Saudi society.79 Therefore, they provide an 
important framework for maintaining national unity. At the same time, reformers 
criticized govemment for ignoring the fact that social reality is not constant, that 
the country and its people transformed dramatically over the decades and these 
changes need to be reflected in the political and legał institutions of the state and in 
the domestic and foreign policies. According to these liberał reformers, when the 
government responds to their demands at all, it does so maintaining old values and 
traditional institutions, to please the most conservative ulama and preachers. “In 
this sense, the threat to the Saudi state comes not only from the spread of religious 
radicalism, but also from the govemment’s response to this radicalism.”
To conclude, it is worth noticing that a large share of analysts believe that 
Saudi Arabia cannot afford a lengthy debate on its reforms. The rapid pace of glob- 
alization risks leaving the Kingdom behind the rest of the world unless it acceler- 
ates the pace of change.80 Saudi Arabian author Turki al-Hamad remarked that 
“ten, twenty years ago, we had the luxury of time. We could choose the kind of 
reform pace we wanted. Now, we either reform ąuickly or collapse.”81
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Kuwait
Kuwait has been ruled by the al-Sabah family sińce 1756. When the country gained 
fuli independence in 1961, the constitution confirmed this situation, giving the 
Emir broad executive powers. In particular, it is he who appoints the prime minis­
ter and the cabinet. At the same time, the constitution established a partially elected 
parliament with some legislative powers; for several decades it had been the only 
national assembly in the GCC states of that kind.82 The parliament has never been 
a rubber-stamp and always discussed openly the vital Kuwaiti issues. Its criticism 
of the govemment, or from the other perspective, its activities perceived as threat- 
ening the political stability of the country, caused the Emir to dissolve it in 1976 
(until the reestablishment in 1981) and again in 1986. When Saddam Hussein at- 
tacked Kuwait, the parliament was still disbanded. After the liberation of Kuwait 
from the Iraqi forces, the Emir, Sheikh Jabir al Ahmad al-Sabah was not eager to 
keep his earlier-made promises of prompt restoring the assembly. Only after the 
mobilization of all Kuwaiti political factions, culminating in the presentation of 
a petition in the spring of 1991, did the emir agree to hołd parliamentary elections 
in October 1992.
The election campaign was very lively.83 Individual candidates in their di- 
waniyyas as well as various voluntary and professional associations were effective 
in articulating critical views, helping to increase political awareness and activities 
of different groups of society. In effect, the election brought to the parliament 
a majority of opposition and independent deputies, critical of the existing political 
arrangements in the country.
Right after the election the opposition called for the separation of the pre- 
viously combined offices of prime minister and crown prince, as traditionally in 
Kuwait, the crown prince (as well as the whole al-Sabah family) were not subject 
to any criticism and control. Only when in a conciliatory move, the Emir appointed 
several members of parliament (who retained some credibility due to the fact that 
they had been popularly elected) as ministers for the first time, the opposition 
eventually gave up and accepted the status quo. Nevertheless, parliamentary com- 
mittees initiated a series of investigations including inquires into the events leading 
to the Iraqi invasion, govemment responsibility for the Kuwaiti defeat, alleged 
corruption and mismanagement in the Kuwait Investment Office (which manages 
the country’s overseas Capital), and the cost-effectiveness of arms-deals with West­
ern powers. These were very sensitive issues whose investigation led to confronta- 
tion with top govemment officials, including members of the ruling family. This 
was the first time in the history of the GCC countries that such people were pub-
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licly ąuestioned, strongly criticized and forced to take responsibility for their ac- 
tions. The whole term of parliament was alive with heated debates over the issue of 
power and wealth sharing, corruption and waste in defense expenditure, the way 
the privatization was conducted and other important issues. The parliament also 
decided to broaden the base of its electorate, extending the right to vote to the large 
number of sons of naturalized Kuwaiti citizens (naturalized men are eligible to vote 
only if they have held Kuwaiti citizenship for at least 20 years).
After tough experiences with dealings with the opposition, the government 
made serious efforts to influence the results of next elections, and the parliament 
chosen in October 1996 was not as confrontational as the previous one had been. 
Nevertheless, tensions between Islamist groups and the govemment did not sub- 
side. First, in 1998, the parliament blocked the govemment deal with the US to buy 
the so-called Paladin artillery due to irregularities in the procurement process. Sec- 
ondly, in 1999, the Islamists attempted to bring down Sheikh Saud Nasser al 
Sabah, the Minister of Information. His ministry had permitted around 160 books 
critical of Islamie orthodoxy to be displayed in the intemational book fair in Ku­
wait. The minister had to resign. The government perceived the action of the oppo­
sition as a breach of the unwritten agreement that Islamists would never attack 
members of the ruling family. The Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad 
al Abdallah al-Sabah wamed that criticizing the ruling family jeopardize the secu­
rity of the country, and that this security would be always put “over and above 
democracy”.84 The Islamists, however, continued to criticize the government. In 
turn, they attacked the Minister of Religious Affairs for publishing a version of the 
Koran with typographical errors. Tensions inereased. When the whole cabinet 
threatened to resign, the Emir dissolved parliament and called for new elections.
The election campaign was again characterized by intense activity on the 
part of various political groupings.85 During traditional political meetings in di- 
waniyyas, candidates openly charged the government with conspiracy, interference 
in the elections, incompetence, corruption, etc. Women’s political rights became 
a central issue in the campaign as the Emir, in a surprising move, announced his 
intention to award women the right to participate in futurę elections. Islamie groups 
opposed the decision and the Emir’s decree was eventually defeated in the all-male 
parliament. Another highly debated issue was the suspended right to hołd tribal 
primaries, whose results had significantly affected previous generał elections.
Altogether, 288 candidates competed for the 50 parliamentary seats during 
the elections of July 3, 1999. Only 113,000 men out of a total Kuwaiti population 
of 793,000 east their balłots. Six groupings played a crucial role in the elections 
campaign and won seats in the parliament: the Islamie Constitutional Movement 
(closely connected to the Muslim Brotherhood), the Kuwaiti Democratic Forum 
(the alliance of liberals, Arab nationalists, leftists, and independents), the Islamie 
Popular Bloc (an orthodox Salafi group demanding strict implementation of the
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Islamie law), the Salafi Movement (a splinter of the Popular Bloc), the National 
Islamie Alliance (a Shi’ite Islamist group) and the National Democratic Bloc 
(a liberał group connected with the academic and business communities). In the 
elections the Islamists won 18 seats altogether: six went to Shi’ite candidates and 
remaining 12 to Sunnis. The main losers were the pro-govemment candidates, with
11 major incumbents losing what earlier had been considered secured seats.
The winning Islamists, in a short period of time, undertook a number of 
actions in the new parliament. In effect an entirely new Sharia-inspired version of 
the penal code was adopted together with a ban on festivals and concerts “that are 
against tradition and morality”. Later the Islamists also managed to force the gov- 
emment to re-introduce gender segregation at the Kuwaiti university. In generał, 
Islamists have wanted to widen the role of the Islamie law. They would like to 
amend the constitution, changing the clause that Sharia is “a main source of legis- 
lation” for “the source of the legislation”. They also reąuested the right that no law 
may be promulgated unless it has been passed by the National Assembly.86 Finally, 
they would like to get Kuwait’s political parties licensed and formally written into 
the country’s legał system.
In 2002 a new crisis between parliament and the govemment occurred 
when the Finance Minister, Youssef al-Ibrahim was accused of abuse of power and 
misappropriation of public funds. In particular, Islamist and independent deputies 
wanted him to acknowledge officially that senior ruling family members authorized 
the expenditure of billions of dollars without the supervision of the Audit Bureau, 
the legislature watchdog for monitoring state fmances. The interpellation pro- 
ceeded to a vote of confidence. But when Sheikh Sabah, the Acting Prime Minister, 
threatened that the whole cabinet would resign if the minister lost the vote, the 
majority of deputies decided not to support the no-confidence motion. Another 
crisis was avoided.
The following parliamentary elections were held on July 5, 2004. They 
were affected by the political situations in the region.87 Removal of Saddam 
Hussein influenced the campaign as govemment could not use the Iraąi threat any 
more to secure support for its candidates. In times of change in the Gulf, liberals 
pushing for modemization of the country expected to obtain more seats in the as­
sembly. On the other hand, Shi’ites also hoped to do better thanks to intemal mo- 
bilization of the group, caused by developments in Iraq, with the Shi’ite majority 
gaining power, after years of discrimination under the Ba’ath party regime. Ten- 
sions between the US and Iran, in the period when Kuwait was improving its rela­
tions with the Islamie Republic, were also expected to influence the election re- 
sults. Those expectations proved wrong. First of all, liberals suffered a stunning 
setback. Both members of the Democratic Platform present in the previous assem­
bly, including prominent opposition leader Abdallah al-Nibari, lost their seats. 
Independent liberals went down from six seats to four. “Shock and horror. Parlia-
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ment topples liberals” was the headline in the daily Al Anbaa. The Islamist tradi- 
tionalists, both Sunni and Shi’ite, became the election winners, taking 21 of the 50 
seats. At the same time, the members of parliament affiliated with existing political 
groupings went down from 32 to 25, probably due to govemment’s efforts to 
weaken all the unofficial political parties. The so-called “service” candidates, who 
emphasized their constituent services rather than political or ideological platforms, 
did also well in a number of districts. Interestingly, two of three Islamist political 
groupings also lost seats. The Islamie Constitutional Movement (in the past con- 
nected with Muslim Brotherhood) went from five to two seats, while the National 
Islamie Alliance (Shi’ite) went from three seats to one. In tum, the salafi groupings 
gained seats, with the Salafi Movement rising from a single seat to three. Inde­
pendent Sunni Islamists went up from five seats during the previous term to six and 
independent Shi’ite Islamists -  from two to three. The defeat of liberals was proba­
bly much influenced by the American politics in the Middle East. President Bush’s 
initiative to bring democracy to the region while occupying Iraq “sends many na- 
tive liberals and democrats under their beds”, worrying of being labeled as Ameri­
can puppets.88 Elections were not completely clean: there were accusations of in- 
creased vote buying, switching districts and registering in different areas.89
The election polarized the Kuwaiti political scene into “the triumvirate of 
the incumbent regime, the tribal center, and opposition Islamists”.90 Most other 
political groupings in between were discredited. Many tribal voters, who in the past 
used to support govemment policies, moved in the other direction to support the 
opposition. The issue of extending vote to women became again an important issue 
in the campaign, especially among liberals. Some women voted in a mock election 
as a demonstration of their desire to obtain more political rights in the country.
Right after the elections, Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Jaber, appointed Sheikh 
Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah the prime minister. For the first time in the history of 
Kuwait, the post of the prime minister was separated from the post of the Crown 
Prince, officially as a response to the public demand, in reality maybe only due to 
the poor health of Crown Prince. The decision placed the prime minister before 
legał inąuires in the parliament, which had been impossible in the past as the Ku­
waiti constitution grants fuli immunity to the ruler and the crown prince. Moreover, 
despite expectations, the new cabinet was not constructed as a counter-balance to 
Islamist dominated parliament and a pro-reform body. “Separation between the 
posts of crown prince and prime minister did not bring any positive changes”, 
Musallam al Barrak declared in the parliament.91 “The govemment does not really 
want reforms”, wrote former Kuwaiti Minister of Information, Saad al Ajmi.92
The first major clash between new parliament and the govemment occurred 
in March 2004. After inąuiry, many deputies tried to force the resignation of the 
Minister of Finance, Mahmoud Al Nouri over allegations of mismanagement and
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sąuandering public money. Eventually, the minister won the non-confidence vote 
(by four votes); nevertheless the opposition accused the govemment of applying 
pressure on numerous deputies to achieve that goal.
In May 2004, the govemment introduced a bill allowing women to vote 
and to stand for election. The parliament, however, has remained divided on the 
issue of women’s suffrage and has taken no action on the bill yet. At the same time, 
the Ministry of Islamie Affairs, responding to pressure from Islamist parliamentari- 
ans, announced fatwa “forbidding women singing to men, reveal part of their body 
and using vulgar words and dancing”.93 To attend or watch such concerts and pro- 
vide any assistąnce or investment in them were also forbidden. Several Islamist 
deputies have also been trying to ban musie education from schools as anti-Islamic 
activity.
Tensions between govemment and the opposition occurred again in June 
2004, when voting on a long debated bill on reducing the number of electoral dis- 
tricts (to eliminate vote-buying, a strategy that is easy in smali districts) was post- 
poned until the fali. Liberał deputies accused govemment and many of their col- 
leagues in the assembly of trying to maintain the undemocratic status quo.94 
However, if this bill is passed, the govemment will probably push harder for 
women’ s suffrage. The govemment anticipates that on the whole, women will con- 
stitute a moderate, pro-govemment force, which can mitigate the destabilizing ef- 
fects that redistricting would have on Kuwait’s complex political scene.95
One of the important factors in the politics of the Kuwaiti opposition, com- 
posed mostly of well-educated, wealthy businessmen, has been that it does not aim 
at overthrowing the al-Sabah rule. The opposition has wanted a stronger say in the 
decision making process, constitutional guarantees for the existence of political 
opposition and free expression, a merit-based govemment willing to share some 
power with them, and more opportunities for their private businesses, but not the 
change of the existing regime.96
Democracy in Kuwait is not limited to the holding of elections and the 
functioning of the parliament. While it is true that the parliament is a foundation of 
Kuwaiti democracy, the press, being mostly privately owned newspapers, has also 
played an important role in safeguarding the democratic principles in the country. 
Furthermore, many public associations and organizations, despite expanded gov- 
emment control, have been able to undertake certain political activities and hołd 
free elections for officers, educating a broad rangę of people on the basics of 
democratic procedure. On the other hand, joumalists highly criticize the existing 
press and publications laws enacted in 1961. According to Saoud Alanezi, editor of 
the left-wing Al Talee’ah weekly: “you could get life imprisonment for something
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you write, even execution”.97 The amendments to these laws have been debated 
sińce 1999, but have not been approved yet. Moreover, political formation has been 
almost a taboo subject in Kuwait. The justifications put forward for not permitting 
establishment of formal political parties have been very feeble. “It is maintained in 
official circles that political parties would upset the delicate social balance which 
includes local nationals with more rights than others, tribal powers, stateless Arabs 
and influential trading families.” But Ahmed Al Khateeb, a former deputy speaker 
of the parliament, called such justification “phony”.98
The mood at the beginning of the 21st century in Kuwait, in contrast to its 
Bahraini and Qatari neighbors, is not very optimistic. Many Kuwaitis feel that their 
country is stagnating, that authorities and parliamentarians are caught up in endless 
squabbles over minor issues, instead of transforming the country, which many 
young, innovative rulers of the neighboring GCC states did already.99 There are 
voices ąuestioning any possibility of further democratization of the state. Ghanim 
Alnajjar believes, that “structural and political weaknesses in the Kuwaiti political 
system continue to hinder the spread of democracy, and may yet cause its failure, 
which might result in a major futurę political crisis”.100 According to many, the 
reasons for limited progress toward the more participatory govemment is the ruling 
family’s tacit alliance with Islamie fundamentalists (for example, to please them 
the govemment in recent years established a committee on Islamization of the law, 
refused to register civil society institutions except Islamie charities and introduced 
more religious instruction into the schools curricula).101 “We have lost the 12 years 
sińce the liberation because of the resistance of the political Islamie movement” 
said Saud Nasir Sabah, oil minister and former ambassador to the United States.102 
“There is not a democratic system in Kuwait, there is not democracy here”, said 
Mohammed Qadiri, a former diplomat, who quit the foreign service over the dis- 
solution of parliament in 1986. “We are marginally better than our neighbors, but 
this is not democracy.”103 In tum, Ahmad al Khateeb said: “Many Kuwaitis believe 
there is democracy in our country but the whole world believes the opposite”. As 
women, soldiers and youth between 18 and 21 cannot participate in election by 
law, only about 15% of the Kuwaitis actually vote. “That tumed democracy into 
a democracy of a minority”.104 Similarly, Saad Al Ajmi stated in June 2004, that 
“the time has come for Kuwaitis to admit that their country is not a democracy.”105
Widespread corruption ranks highly among other issues criticized by re-
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formist deputies. “Elections are precooked as some parliamentarians buy votes”, 
stated Ahmed al Khateeb, former deputy speaker of the assembly”.106 “The Kuwait 
City Municipality has become the seat of corruption in the country”, alarmed Ah­
med Saadoun in the parliament.107 Although such comments did not bring immedi- 
ate results, they show, on the one hand, a large degree of freedom of expression in 
Kuwait, and on the other the depth of the analysis of the existing problems in the 
country.
Among several reasons for this lack of progress toward modemization of 
the country, the most important is probably the relatively weak leadership caused 
by the old age and the poor health of the leaders. The ailing Emir, Sheikh Jabir past 
75 years of age in 2003, having been on the throne for more than 25 years. Crown 
Prince Saad Abdallah Sabah is about the same age and is also ill.
The situation in Kuwait has been, of course, a complex one. By many 
measures Kuwait has had a more developed civil society than found elsewhere 
among the GCC states. It has critical press enjoying relative freedom, a tradition of 
public debate in the diwaniyyas and active parliament, which exercises significant 
influence and control over govemance by the ruling family. On the other hand -  
a fact emphasized every year by the US State Department report on human rights -  
there is a restricted freedom of assembly, as well as discrimination of women, 
Shi’ites and foreign residents, censorship of “morally offensive” materials, and 
lack of the independence of the judiciary, to mention a few problems only. Alto- 
gether, the country remains a tightly controlled hereditary emirate, where al Sabah 
family still wield unąuestionable power.
Bahrain
Bahrain has been a state vulnerable to political conflicts. First of all, the country is 
relatively poor when compared to its oil-rich neighbors; therefore rulers cannot 
offer their subjects as much as in the neighboring countries and the unemployment 
in the country has always been high. Secondly, it is ruled by Sunni minority, and 
Shi’ite majority in the island has often considered itself as discriminated against. 
The al-Khalifa family ruling the country sińce 1783 had a monopoly on power until 
the adoption of the constitution in 1973, which provided for a partially elected Na­
tional Assembly. The Assembly was short lived though. In 1975 the emir called its 
activities “obstructionist” and dissolved it. With the Iranian revolution of 1979 and 
the accompanying spread of its Islamie ideas, resentment among Bahrain’s Shi’ite 
population against the regime intensified. Since then the Shi’ites clashed with the 
government numerous times. The opposition demanded the restoration of the Na­
tional Assembly through direct and free elections as mandated by the constitution, 
hoping that in such a way it may have more to say in the country’s affairs.
106 B. Z a ' za, “Former deputy speaker says democracy in Kuwait is a sham”
107 “Kuwait MPs lament corruption” ...
Tensions grew also after the Second Gulf War. In July 1992 over 200 hun- 
dred Bahrainis, both Sunnis and Shi’ites, signed and submitted to the Emir a peti­
tion demanding liberalization of the regime. Rather than complying with their de­
mands, Emir Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa established the appointed Consulta- 
tive Council. Like its Saudi or UAE counterparts, the Bahraini Council could only 
review legislation sent to it by the govemment. Nevertheless, in an attempt to im- 
prove relations with the opposition, 30 members of the Council were divided be­
tween Sunnis and Shi’ites, and a Shi’ite, former minister of transportation Ibrahim 
Hamidan, became its President. Despite that protests continued. When the Com­
mittee of the Popular Petition, created in 1994, sent another petition to the Emir 
calling for greater popular participation in government, the leaders of the Commit­
tee were arrested, leading to a two-year long wave of demonstrations and riots. At 
the same time the difficult economic position of the country, with no major oil or 
gas deposits and ineffective administration, increased tensions.
The situation began to change only in 1998, when after the death of Sheikh 
Isa, his son, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, decided to liberalize the system. In 
the beginning of the year 2000, he appointed new members to the Consultative 
Council, including non-Muslims for the first time: a Jewish, a Christian and an 
Indian Bahraini, as well as four women. Then, the Emir abolished the emergency 
laws that were in the force in the country for 25 years and pardoned more than 900 
prisoners and exiles; in effect many prominent figures of the former opposition, 
mostly Shi’ites, retumed to the country. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee 
was set up. At the same time Sheikh Hamad promised to grant nationality to sev- 
eral thousand of bidoon, mostly Shi’ite stateless inhabitants, which became another 
source of tension. The Emir decided also to compensate hundreds of govemment 
employees, mostly Shi’ites, for salaries lost while they were detained without 
a trial for up to three years in connection with the political unrest of the 1990s. As 
all these measures were welcomed by the Shi’ite majority, the Emir became ready 
to significantly reform his country.
In December 2000, the special committee operating under Emir’s instruc- 
tions proposed far-reaching changes to the political system of Bahrain. “The Na­
tional Action Charter” proposed by the Committee, stated that “HH the Emir pos- 
sesses the ambition to achieve a democratic way of life” and that “there is 
agreement on the need to modernize the constitution of the country to benefit from 
the democracy experiences of other peoples in expanding the circle of popular par­
ticipation in the tasks of ruling and administration.”108 The Charter, a constitutional 
declaration, made Bahrain a constitutional monarchy; Sheikh Hamad the King and 
the al-Khalifa family hereditary rulers of the island. A parliament was to be estab­
lished and consist of two chambers with equal legislative powers: Council of 
Deputies consisting of 40 members elected by popular vote, and a consultative 
council, the Shura Council, also composed of 40 people but appointed by the King. 
The executive power, the legislature, and the judiciary were to be separated. All
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citizens were made equal in the eyes of law regardless of their religion, sect or 
social class. Constitutional Court and Audit Bureau were to be established and 
enjoy fuli independence. The Ombudsman was to be appointed to investigate com- 
plaints from the public.
On February 14, 2001, the changes proposed in the National Action Char­
ter were submitted to a referendum and overwhelmingly approved by the Bahrainis 
(98.4%), including the Shi’ite opposition.
On the first anniversary of the referendum, on February 14, 2002, Sheikh 
Hamad issued royal decrees reinstating the suspended 1973 constitution and 
amending it to implement the above-mentioned changes, which was practically the 
promulgation of the new constitution.
Opposition was not completely satisfied with these developments. They 
would have preferred the restoration of the old constitution without changes and 
reinstatement of the elected parliament. They were further dissatisfied with the new 
constitution that confirmed most of the powers in the ruler’s hands. The king’s 
prerogatives include control of the govemment, dismiss the prime minister, and 
dissolve parliament if he has a “sufficient reason” to do so, as well as in case of 
“emergences”.109 The opposition also criticized the way the reforms were intro- 
duced; the King unilaterally made constitutional changes, contrary to the unambi- 
guous provisions of the 1973 constitution itself, and in the absence of elected leg- 
islature. Moreover, the opposition criticized the fact, that the appointed chamber 
would have a direct legislative role equal to that of the elected chamber and even 
taking certain precedence over the elected one, as its chairman was to be the 
speaker of the whole new bi-cameral National Assembly (the govemment argues 
that the appointed Shura Council is needed to guarantee that experienced and 
highly educated public figures would be able to take part in the process of policy 
making).
Despite the shortcomings of the introduced reforms, in the new situation in 
the country, non-govemmental organizations of all types: cultural, religious, politi­
cal and civic have mushroomed. By January 2004 there had been 322 registered 
political, social and professional organizations as well as 38 trade unions.110 In 
particular, numerous political groups, the so-called “societies”, ranging from fun- 
damentalist to Marxists, came into being. They have practically played the role of 
political parties but have not been allowed neither to assume the name of party nor 
operate as such.
After amending the constitution, the king called for the first elections: at 
the municipal level. Women were allowed to participate as well as foreigners who 
owned property and were legał residents and other GCC states’ nationals residing 
on the island. Political groupings actively engaged themselves in the election proc­
ess. They tried to secure as much democracy in the process as possible. In particu­
lar, senior Shi’ite clerics voiced their grievances that “the govemment is playing
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the sectarian card and trying to derail the democratic process through gerryman- 
dering”.111 The authorities were criticized for redrawing the map of electoral con- 
stituencies to moderate, if not totally eliminate, the effects of the Shi’ite majority in 
most regions of Bahrain. King Hamad himself was trying to mend fences with the 
opposition and decided just before the polling day that all members of the Bahraini 
Defense Force, the National Guard, the police and security services would not be 
eligible to vote. Therefore, a solid bloc of some 15,000 Sunni voters was removed 
from the scene, giving more chances to Shi’ite candidates. The King, addressing 
the public before the Election Day called on his subjects “to exercise their consti- 
tutional right in complete freedom and responsibility. To exercise this right is 
a duty because without it democracy will be not able to survive.”112
The elections took place on May 9 and 16, 2002, in two rounds of voting. 
Over 300 candidates, including 31 women, were registered for five 10-seats coun­
cils. Voters’ tumover was substantial: 40-80%, depending on the constituency. 
Religiously affiliated candidates became the important winners, obtaining 38 out of 
50 seats; remaining candidates were considered independent runners. The Islamie 
National Wafaą Society, a coalition of Shi’ite eleries, networks and individuals, 
generally in opposition to the King, succeeded in placing most of its candidates in 
the councils. The failure of liberał and leftist candidates to win a single seat in the 
municipal councils meant that they were unable to present themselves to the public 
as a viable altemative to candidates supported by the clerical establishment. The 
poor tumout of women was not really surprising in the traditional, male-dominated 
society, especially as in most cases they ran against małe candidates from the same 
political organization. Nevertheless, after the elections all of women candidates 
urged the King “to order an investigation into the transgressions witnessed during 
the elections and to take the necessary steps against those behind them.”113 They 
complained that some małe candidates used mosąues and religious community 
centers to launch attacks on female candidates. The leading leftist group, the Na­
tional Democratic Action Society also criticized undemocratic practices exercised by 
many candidates on the polling day, including illegal campaigning and vote buying.
The municipal elections were not that important in itself, the municipal 
councils are responsible only for public works and roads, but everybody perceived 
them as the “dress rehearsal” for the fortheoming crucial pools to elect members to 
the new parliament.
When the parliamentary elections were approaching, in August 2002, 78 
Bahraini intellectuals presented the King with a petition, protesting against the ban 
on the participation of political associations in the elections campaign. Then, four 
major opposition groups (the Islamie National Wafaq, the National Democratic 
Action, the Islamie Action and the Democratic Nationalist Tajammu) sent a letter 
to the King demanding again the restoration of the un-changed 1973 constitution. 
They believed that the new parliament would not be able to perform its legislative
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duties as the amended constitution gave equal power to the appointed council. In 
response to these protests, the King allowed political associations to participate in 
the election campaign. Nevertheless, as other demands were not met, major oppo­
sition groups decided to boycott the elections. Only some minor groups decided to 
participate in it, like the ex-Marxist Progressive Democratic Tribune.
In such circumstances, only 190 candidates registered, much fewer than for 
the far less important municipal elections. Eight women decided to run in the elec­
tions, receiving fuli, official and highly publicized support from the King’s wife.
To improve the atmosphere before the elections, the new labor and trade 
unions law was introduced by King Hamad, giving more rights to the already ex- 
isting unions, giving workers the possibility of collective bargaining and strike, and 
allowing foreign workers to join unions. Trade unions were, nevertheless, not satis- 
fied with the new law, due to some ambiguous provisions it incorporated.
On October 24, the first round of parliamentary elections took place. De- 
spite calls from the opposition to boycott the elections, 53.2% voters went to the 
polis, well above most expectations. Nineteen candidates who obtained more than 
50% of the vote were elected to the 40-seat Parliament in the first round, including 
three who ran unopposed. The remaining 21 seats were decided in the run-off elec­
tions on October 31.
Elections went smoothly. The Bahraini Humań Rights Society was allowed 
to monitor the polis. Nevertheless, opposition groups said that the govemment used 
authoritarian tactics to thwart the boycott. Moreover, voters had their passports 
stamped, leading to fears among citizens that they might suffer conseąuences if 
they did not have the stamp.
Sunni Islamists became the winners of the election, obtaining, together 
with their sympathizers, a majority in the lower house. Two Shi’ite Islamists were 
elected as well, despite the fact that their numerous co-religionists stayed home 
obeying the boycott cali from their party leaders. Both woman candidates who 
made it to the second round run-off were defeated. Therefore, to balance the com- 
position of the state bodies and to lower futurę potential problems in the legislature, 
the King himself appointed a large number of pro-govemment “secularists”, 
“liberals” and women to the upper house. In particular, he nominated several de- 
fense officials and public servants, six women and a Jewish trader.
Immediately after the elections, the King enacted a new press and publish- 
ing law, by some perceived as very progressive, but criticized by others as again 
giving to much power to the executive. He also issued a highly controversial edict 
extending impunity to all govemment officials, civil servants, security and military 
officers, for all acts committed in the past. This outraged the opposition, who 
claimed that the real democratic transformation must include dealing with the past 
and punish people responsible for repressions, misrule and corruption.
Political life in the country intensified further after the parliamentary elec­
tions. The Council of Deputies demanded more legislative and monitoring powers
for itself.114 Several members of the Council submitted a proposal to legalize po­
litical parties. In April 2003, the deputies formed a commission to investigate the 
collapse of two govemment-managed pension funds. In January 2004, despite gov- 
emment objections, they submitted a report providing information of extensive 
mismanagement and corruption by the funds’ senior staff and recommended that 
the deputies question the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Labor, and Minister 
of State on the matter (the first step before a vote of no-confidence). Eventually, 
the three ministers were ąuestioned, a move with historical significance as it estab­
lished a parliamentary tradition.115 The govemment, however, managed to gain the 
upper hand using legał technicalities. Ministers were not asked certain ąuestions or 
were held accountable for certain actions; finally they remained in their posts in- 
tact. At the same time, the govemment promised to rescue two pension funds and 
compensate members for their loses.
In tum, the nominated Shura Council, trying also to stress its role in the 
country’s political system, urged the media to play a greater role in the democrati- 
zation process, and asked the govemment to draw up a comprehensive national 
strategie plan of social and economic developments for the next 20 years, to estab- 
lish a Financial Monitoring Bureau to help combat corruption and an Administra- 
tive Monitoring Bureau to verify the soundness and legality of administrative sys- 
tems and their compatibility with intemational ąuality standards in this regard.116
Six of Bahrain’s major political groups, religious and secular, signed in 
March 2003 a “charter of unity”, aimed to coordinate their opposition to the king­
dom’s amended constitution, which they claimed to have eliminated the principle 
of separation of power. There were three Islamists groups: The Islamie National 
Wefaq Society, the Islamie Arab Wasat Society, and the Islamie Action Society 
and three secular groups with left-wing inclinations: the National Democratic Ac­
tion Society, the Progressive Democratic Minbar Society, and the Nationalist 
Błock. All these groups boycotted the parliamentary elections as they insisted that 
the elected council should have exclusive legislative powers. In April, they started 
a campaign of collecting signatures on a petition to the king to change the constitu­
tion. In their opinion, the govemment Controls the parliament and the elected house 
is unable to respond to the public needs.117 The Bahraini royal court wamed or- 
ganizers that what they were doing was illegal, and that only the National Assem­
bly and the king himself had the right to propose or endorse constitutional changes. 
Eventually, in May 2004, several activists collecting signatures were arrested. In Feb- 
ruary 2004, four of these societies (the Wefaq, the Islamie Action, the National Demo­
cratic Action and the Nationalist Bloc) organized a controversial “constitutional” con­
ference to discuss the issue of establishing of a genuine constitutional monarchy in 
Bahrain and for restriction of powers of the Shura Council to only consultative ones. 
The govemment at the beginning would oppose the conference, but finally allowed it,
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although denied admittance of invited foreign experts, saying that foreigners should not 
intervene in purely domestic Bahraini affairs.
To summarize, while many praise King Hamad’s actions as really intro- 
ducing some democracy in the Kingdom, the opposition claims that they have just 
been a window-dressing, calculated to deflect domestic and intemational criticism.118
The Bahrain Humań Rights Society acknowledged that Bahrain has taken 
“a giant step” in liberalizing its political system and extending personal freedoms 
but stressed that much more needs to be done. “Political rights have been restricted 
to candidacy and voting in the municipal and parliamentary elections when the 
issue is much broader one.”119
According to Sheikh Ali Salman, chairman of the Shi’ite popular main- 
stream Al Wefaq Society, “the security situation has calmed down but the political 
one is still a stalemate”.120 Public protests became acceptable and there have not 
been arbitrary arrests. More freedom of worship and expression was granted to 
Shi’ites, although they continue to be disadvantaged in state jobs.
A possible futurę source of tensions can be the growing power of religious 
fundamentalists, both Sunni and Shi’ite. Some Bahrainis worry that the radicals 
may eventually move to restrict personal freedoms and attempt to amend constitu­
tion to make Sharia the sole source of the legislation. Religious fundamentalists 
already demand greater public observance of Islamie practices. First indication of 
this was their proposal to ban alcohol sales to Muslims, closing down hotels cater­
ing for weekend tourists from the GCC states, restricting mixing of sexes at Bah­
rain’s University and stop public concerts of Westemized Arab singers.
Yet, taking all the developments into account, Bahrain can definitely be 
said to have become the most advanced GCC country in the democratic process.
Qatar
Qatar, the smallest GCC country, is ruled under the 1970 constitution by małe rep- 
resentatives of the al-Thani family. The Emir holds absolute power, though he con- 
sults with leading Qataris on policy issues and works to achieve consensus with the 
appointed 30-member Consultative Council (whose members have not changed 
sińce 1975).
In January 1992, 54 leading citizens presented the Qatari Emir with a peti­
tion criticizing the lack of freedom of expression in the media and unclear laws 
regarding citizenship and naturalization, as well as demanding the establishment of 
a new consultative assembly with “wide legislative and investigative authority 
through which actual political participation is provided”.121 The authors of the pe-
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tition called for this body to prepare immediately a new constitution “that guaran- 
tees the establishment of democracy”. They also expressed concem over the abuse 
of power in the country. The petition did not bring any results. The old Emir, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani had rejected any liberalization of the regime, 
and the broadening of political participation did not begin until his son, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa, assumed power in 1995 (staging a successful coup against his 
farther).
First, the new Emir abolished the Ministry of Information, a move calcu- 
lated to demonstrate his willingness to limit govemment censorship of the media. 
Then, in the new atmosphere, the now famous independent al-Jazeera satellite TV 
channel was opened. The channel, seen and heard in all Arab countries, introduced 
controversial and provocative new programs and news bulletins that criticize Arab 
rulers, governments and policies as well as the lack of rights and freedoms in the 
Arab world, and advocate the need for significant change in Islamie law. Opposi­
tion figures and women often participate in al-Jazeera programs, which shortly 
became the most popular TV program in the whole Arab world.
Next move by Sheikh Hamad was to cali for generał elections for the Cen­
tral Municipal Council, a 29-member advisory body that oversees the work of nine 
municipalities. The Emir allowed women to vote for and run as candidates for seats 
on the Council.122
This latest move faced certain opposition. In June 1998, 18 noted Islamist 
figures presented a petition to the Emir that criticized the idea, given that such 
election would afford women “public authority” and the potential for “leadership 
over men”.123 The petition, however, did not have any effect on Emir’s policies.
Sheikh Hamad, in his speech at Georgetown University in 1998, while de- 
scribing his reforms, quoted President John F. Kennedy’s remark that those who 
fail to make peaceful revolutions possible make violent revolutions inevitable. “We 
have simply got to reform ourselves. We’re living in a modem age. People log on 
to the Internet. They watch cable TV. You cannot isolate yourself in today’s world. 
And our reforms are progressing well. In a tribal country like Qatar, however, it 
could take time for everyone to accept what we’ve done.”124
The first election in Qatar, even before the one to the Municipal Council, 
was for the board of the Chamber of Commerce, whose members had previously 
been nominated by the Emir. Close to 3,700 Qatari businessmen cast secret bal- 
lots in April 1998, electing 17 members of the board. In tum, the Ministry of 
Education called for the establishment of elected student unions in all schools. In 
another exercise of democracy, in November 1998, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy canceled the elections for the board of al-Muntazah Consumer Asso- 
ciation after it had been discovered that the number of ballots cast was higher
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than the number of eligible voters; new elections were simultaneously called for.
The elections to the Central Municipal Council took place on March 8,
1999 without incidents.125 On the ballot were 227 candidates, including six women, 
and about 95 per cent of eligible voters participated in election in Doha, with only 
a slightly lower percentage participating in the rest of the country (though the 
number of registered voters was only 22,225 people, which accounted for a smali 
percentage of the total local population of approximately 160,000). The winners of 
the elections were mostly young technocrats and professionals, elected on the basis 
of personal preference or family and tribal ties. Significantly, two noted political 
figures, often critical of the government, lost in the election: Najib Muhammad al- 
Rubai, a former Minister of Justice, and Muhammad Salih al-Kawari. No women 
were elected, suggesting that Qatar remains a traditional society.
Despite the fact that the Municipal Council has a limited importance and 
supervises only the implementation of laws and resolutions concerning the Minis­
try of Municipal and Agricultural Affairs, the very idea of elections to a govem- 
mental body was an important step in democratization of the regime.126
The successful municipal elections made Sheikh Hamad easier about con- 
ducting the next step: introduction of a permanent constitution (a temporary one 
has been in effect sińce 1972) providing for the establishment of elected parliament 
to be chosen by all Qataris, regardless of gender.
On July 2, 2002, the 32-member committee preparing the new constitution, 
presented a draft of the document.
On April 29, 2003, in a popular referendum, more than 96% Qataris voted 
in favor of the constitution (but only 24,000 people registered themselves for vot- 
ing, not even every other eligible Qatari).
The constitution describes Qatar as a democratic state, grants universal suf­
frage, and confirms the role of the state in providing for the social, economic, and edu- 
cational well-being of its citizens. It also confirms Qatar as a hereditary state and speci- 
fies Sharia as the main source of legislation. The constitution creates a 45-member 
council (Majlis al Shura) to legislate, vote on the stage budget and monitor the govem- 
ment activities with the right to ąuestion ministers and to vote them out of office 
through a vote of confidence. The 20 members of the council were to be elected and 
the remaining 15 were to be appointed by the Emir. All Qataris over 18 years of age 
were to be eligible to vote and run for office. The constitution was also to provide for 
freedom of association, expression and religious practice, as well as an independent 
judiciary.
On June 8, 2004, Emir Hamad promulgated the constitution, although it 
will not come into fuli effect for another year. During this period new constitu­
tional institutions will be formed and appropriate laws enacted. In the meantime, in 
May 2004, Emir issued decrees allowing creation of professional societies and 
trade unions (with a right to organize strikes).
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There are at least two reasons why Emir Hamad decided to broaden politi­
cal participation in Qatar. First, having some problems with the support from 
members of the older generation, he wanted to obtain it from younger Qataris, 
many of whom had obtained Western educated and more cosmopolitan. For many 
of them, democratization means making Qatar prominent among its neighbors, and 
obtaining a dynamie and leading role in the region.127 Secondly, Hamad wanted to 
win friendship in the West, to oppose threats from his ousted father and to balance 
off pressures from his more powerful GCC neighbors. In this context it is worth to 
note, that in 2003 the US moved to Qatar all its forces formerly stationed in Saudi 
Arabia, and that the main US command center for the Iraqi invasion was also lo- 
cated in the emirate. In Saudi eyes, the close, though sometimes conflicting rela- 
tions between Riyadh and Doha, and the countries’ shared ultra-conservative 
Wahhabi version of Islam, make Qatar a particularly relevant testing ground for the 
establishment of a partially elected legislature in Saudi Arabia. Reforms introduced 
by Emir Hamad have also been carefully watched by all other GCC states.
Although from a certain point of view Qatar is often described as being at 
the vanguard of democratization in the Arab world, one has to be aware of the 
shorteomings of its constitution.128 It ąualifies the right of people to assembly and 
does not allow operation of political parties. The Emir appoints the govemment 
and Controls its agenda, has the power to błock any legislation, can implement laws 
by decrees, and can dissolve the parliament at will. The legislation becomes law 
only with the vote of two-thirds majority and the emir’s endorsement. But this has 
to be understood in the country’s context. Qatar citizenry is free of sectarian, eth- 
nic, or even significant political divisions. There is no ąuestioning of the legitimacy 
of the ruling Al Thani family. Therefore, reforms have been promulgated from the 
top and not as a response to popular discontent.
Reforms in Qatar did not end in promulgating a new constitution and or- 
ganization of a municipal election. The recently introduced reform of the educa- 
tional system can also have a significant impact on the futurę politics of the coun­
try. Classes of Science and English were introduced at the expense of religious 
courses. In 2002 women were allowed for the first time to study at the engineering 
faculty of the Qatar University, etc. Moreover, in 2003 Emir Hamad nominated 
Ahmed al-Mahmud the Minister of Education -  the first female cabinet minister in 
the GCC states. At the same time he appointed Sheikha Abdullah al-Misnad the 
president of the Qatar University. Emir’s wife, Sheikha Mouza Bint Nasser al- 
Misnad, has been strongly involved in promotion of education and women’s rights. 
Thanks to her personal involvement the so-called Education City was established 
in Doha where Western universities were allowed to open their branches. Further 
supporting the role of women, Sheikh Hamad appointed a number of women to 
important positions in public offices; one became a public prosecutor -  the first
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women to held such a post in the GCC states. Along with having voting rights, 
Qatari women were granted a unique status in the monarchies of the Gulf.
Oman
Oman, once a great maritime power among Arabs, is has been ruled sińce the 18* 
century by the al bu Said dynasty. After a series of intemal and extemal conflicts in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and most significantly the Dhofar rebellion, Qaboos bin Said 
al-Said carried a coup in 1970 against his unsuccessful father. Supported by the 
British, Qaboos won and became the Sułtan. He ąuickly proved to be an effective 
and modem leader. Under his rule, Oman has become one of the success stories in 
the Arab world. The country advanced economically despite limited oil reserves; 
education became a govemment priority, relations with the neighbors were normalized, 
former intemal rivals were incorporated into the system of govemment, etc.
In the 1990s Oman made several strides towards broadening of the political 
participation; this happened on the sole initiative of the ruler, without any demands 
from the public (there is practically no opposition in Oman129). First, in 1991, Suł­
tan Qaboos established the new Consultative Council (Majłis al-Shura), replacing 
the old State Consultative Council (Majlis al-Istishari lil-Dawla) existing sińce 
1981. The 59-seat Council was granted the right to debate on economic, social and 
development issues, review laws, evaluate govemment plans and ąuestion minis­
ters, and hołd joint meetings with the govemment twice a year. At the same time, it 
has no right to be heard in Oman’s foreign, defense and security policies. The Suł­
tani decree provided that elders, prominent businessman and intellectuals from 
each of Oman’s 59 provinces choose two potential assembly members and the 
Sułtan appoints one of those two nominees to represent that province. The presi- 
dent of the Council is appointed by a Royal Decree, while his two deputies are 
elected by the members of the Council in a secret ballot.
After the end of the first three-year term, in 1994, the Council was expanded to 
80 seats, giving the Sułtan a chance to nominate more people to it, especially former 
govemment officials. In a groundbreaking decision, the Sułtan appointed the first two 
woman members of the Council. It was the first case for women to be allowed to par- 
ticipate in a political process of any kind in all GCC states.130
In 1997, membership of the Council was expanded to 82 persons and in 
2000 to 83 because of the increase in the country’s population. Moreover, the Suł­
tan allowed women to stand for election and to vote for candidates to the Council. 
Over 20 women were among the several hundred nominees in the 1997 elections, 
and the Council had eventually two women members.
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In 1997, Sułtan Qaboos established a new 41-seat consultative body, the all 
nominated State Council (Majlis al-Dawla). This Council, akin to an upper house, 
reviews the proposals of the Majlis al-Shura and forwards those it deems important 
to the govemment or to Sułtan Qaboos; it can also deal with more important politi­
cal matters. Majlis al-Shura and Majlis al-Dawla comprise together the Majlis 
Oman, or Council of Oman.131
One of the reasons to establish new council was to give the Sułtan a chance 
to accommodate those who were unsuccessful in the elections to the Majlis al- 
Shura and to eliminate potential tensions between rival clans, tribes and business- 
men created by the election results. This was clearly visible in the formation of the 
first Majlis al-Dawla, whose nominated members became former ministers, under- 
secretaries, ambassadors, judges or retired officers. Five women were selected to it 
as well.
Sułtan Qaboos, further supporting the idea of introducing women to the 
country political life, appointed in 1998-99 the first woman ambassador (to the 
Netherlands) and named three women deputy ministers in the cabinet. He also in- 
cluded the first woman to the board of directors of the Omani Chamber of Com- 
merce. Finally, in March 2003 he appointed Sheikha Aisha Bint Khalfan bin Jumiel 
Al Siyabiąah as President of the Public Authority for Craft Industries at the rank of 
a minister.
The electoral body has been conseąuently expanded; in the September 
2000 elections to Majlis al-Shura the electorate consisted of 175,000 people, 
a ąuarter of Omani adults (as compared to only 50,000 in 1997 elections, about 
three per cent of the population, and 5,000 in 1991). Voters were chosen by tribal 
councils selected by the walis or govemors and their representatives in the coun­
try^ 59 wilayats. Out of them 114,567 registered for voting, with 87.8% actually 
casting their ballots. Total of 541 candidates, including 21 women, were in the fray 
(but only two women were successful, both from the Muscat governorate). In a 
move towards the goal of having the whole Majlis al-Shura elected directly, in 
2000, candidates with the highest numbers of votes were for the first time auto- 
matically given seats on the Council, rather than being picked from among the top 
scores by the Sułtan.
In the 2003 elections for the first time all Omani citizens who have attained 
the age of 21 (approximately 822,000), both men and women, were eligible to vote. 
Nevertheless, only 262,000 (i.e. 32%) registered, and only 74% of the registered, 
that is around 194,000 actually east their votes on October 2. The elections did not 
bring much change in the composition of the Majlis al-Shura. Only 15 women 
stood for election, out of 506 candidates, and, as before, only two (actually the 
same as during the previous term) were elected, despite even the fact that a third of 
registered voters (95,000) were women.
During the elections, the authorities promoting national integration, called 
on citizens to rise above their tribal loyalties and vote for the candidates deemed
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right to represent them. The main slogan of an awareness campaign launched by 
the Ministry of the Interior in the summer of 2000 was ‘Vote for Oman, not for 
your tribe’. Nevertheless, in all elections held so far most voters have stuck to tribal 
and elan loyalties when it came to casting their ballots. “Despite the existence of 
modem state structures, contemporary Omani society continues to be ran by a tri­
bal mentality.”132
Consultative councils ąuickly started to play an important role in the coun­
try^ political life. They met regularly, debated important social and economic 
matters, proposed new laws, ąuestioned govemment’s officials. Hearings at the 
Majłis ał-Shura have been broadcasted live on television.
Another action of crucial importance for the development of democracy in 
Oman, was the introduction of the Basic Law -  the first de facto constitution -  in
1996. It promulgated the principles goveming the Sultanate, highlighted the rights 
and responsibilities of citizens, and, above all, defined the powers and duties of the 
executive. It provided for an independent judiciary, due process of law, freedom of 
press and of assembly, and prohibition of discrimination of any kind. Several laws 
and regulations reąuired to implement these provisions have been enacted in the 
following years. In particular, the Supreme Court in Muscat as well as courts of 
appeals in various wilayas were established, and the new press and publication law 
was introduced.
Oman has a relatively liberał environment, although the sultanate is an ab- 
solute monarchy with no political parties.133 All matters are subject to the Sultan’s 
interpretation and decrees. He has a complete authority over all decision-making. 
The Sułtan is both the head of the state and the prime minister, as well as the com- 
mander-in-chief of the armed forces; moreover, he Controls the portfolios of de- 
fense and foreign affairs. But at the same time, Sułtan Qaboos is a fair-minded, 
liberał ruler who tries to maximize the support base for his policies by taking ad- 
vice from as broad a spectrum of people as possible, but especially tribal leaders, in 
accordance with Omani tradition and cultural norms. His gradual approach to de- 
mocratization of the country and political reforms are often praised in the Gulf as 
the best possible way to do so.
The United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates is a federation of a group of tribally-based sheikhdoms, 
established as a unified state structure in 1971. Thanks to huge oil revenues, the 
UAE managed to transform itself in a short period of time into a very modem and 
wealthy country. Under the constitution, rulers of the seven emirates make up the 
Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative and executive body. The Council
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elects a state president and the president appoints the prime minister and cabinet. 
Sheikh Zayed bin Sułtan Ał Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi Dhabi emirate, has 
been the President sińce the beginning, 1971.
The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, have the least developed system of political 
representation. The male-only, rulers’ nominated 40-members Federal National 
Council, plays only an advisory role, cannot introduce bills or debate any matter of 
public concem if the govemment objects (that is, “if it is detrimental to the higher 
interest of the union”).134 Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, the number of issues dis- 
cussed by the Council, and the number of cabinet ministers appearing before it 
(including some members of the ruling family) increased. Moreover, its members 
had the possibility to elect the president of the Council in a rather free manner. In 
some emirates local consultative bodies to advice rulers have also been developed.
The issue of the establishment of an elected parliament has not yet been put 
forward, one reason for that being that there is no opposition or any political 
groups operating in this rentier state.
For approximately a ąuarter of a century, the UAE did not have a perma- 
nent constitution, as numerous attempts to approve one failed due to lack of agree- 
ment among the emirates on the prerogatives of the federal authorities; smali emir­
ates have traditionally worried that large and rich emirates, like Abu Dhabi, would 
dominate them. The temporary 1971 constitution became eventually permanent in
1997, though practically no changes were introduced to it at that time, despite the 
criticism that it contains outdated laws.
The judicial system comprises both Sharia and the secular courts. The judi- 
ciary is not independent; its decisions are subject to review by the political leader- 
ship. Nevertheless, the basie due process of law exists. Media are controlled by the 
govemment but non-censored foreign television broadcasts via satellite and inter­
net are widely available. There are no trade unions in the country; the government 
limits freedom of assembly and associations.
Women are well represented in the workforce and are well educated (the 
Emirati women occupy 40% of public sector posts, while 70% of all university 
students are women) but do not held any high-level positions in the govemment. 
Expectations that first women may be nominated to the Federal National Council 
have not materialize yet. Nevertheless, the First Lady, Sheikha Fatima Bint Muba- 
rak, the chairperson of the Women’s General Union often claims that there is 
nothing preventing women from taking part in the political life, noting that this is 
a right which is neither forbidden by religion nor prevented by the constitution. 
Only the progressive ruler of Sharjah appointed five women to his local consulta- 
tive council. In the interesting developments, the Crown Prince of the emirate of 
Ras Al Khajmah was dethroned by his father in June 2003, apparently largely due 
to the activity of his wife, criticized by conservative members of the ruling elite for 
being a women’s rights activist.135
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In generał, the country, especially the highly cosmopolitan emirate of Du- 
bai, has been much more liberał and open to the world than other GCC states. One 
of the reasons for that has been that citizens, local Arabs, constitute only about 25 
per cent of the population, the rest being foreign workforce.
Among limited recent political developments, the UAE, under the pressure 
from the Intemational Labor Organization, have initiated measures to allow forma- 
tion of workers’ organizations in the country. Moreover, the election of officers 
was allowed in certain public institutions, including the Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry, suggesting that authorities are testing the possibility of introducing 
such democratic procedures in other public bodies.
In generał, the UAE is the only GCC country where so far no significant 
movements towards broadening of the political representation have taken place. 
There is no pressure from the public at large to change the situation as the enor- 
mous wealth of the country continues to make most people satisfied. Fatma Al 
Sayegh argued that restructuring the UAE’s political system will be “laden with 
difficulties”, but is nonetheless feasible.136
Prospects for further democratization of the Gulf monarchies
Will the broadening of political participation in the GCC states continue? Can the 
occurrences presented above really lead towards the Western type of democracy?
On one hand, there are many obstacles to the democratization process.
First of all, as times have shown, Gulf monarchies are ąuite stable regimes, 
contrary to stereotypical views in the West, where they are freąuently seen as 
anachronistic systems and destined to disappear with modemization.137 Thus, rulers 
do not always see the necessity to transform their regimes ąuickly and extensively 
to stay in power. Moreover, they do not think they need the support of their people 
to govern; constitutions and traditions legitimize their positions. They also feel 
secure given that the United States and other Western countries, despite the 
changes in their approach they sometimes pronounced to non-democratic regimes, 
do not like to de-stabilize the region further after the Iraąi experience and with few 
exceptions continue to be committed to the maintenance of the GCC countries’ 
status quo due to strategie importance of oil they posses.138 In such circumstances, 
rulers often perceive the broadening of political participation in their countries as 
another gracious gift they may offer their subjects, rather than an action reąuired to 
satisfy the vital needs of their populations. The circumstances have seemed differ-
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ent only in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where pressure from the West and the al- 
Qaeda terrorist attacks in the first place, as well as the demands of the Shi’ite-led 
opposition in the latter, are factors strongly influencing the change.
In tum, the “subjects” at large, maybe except of the Shi’ite population, do 
not look for political reforms themselves, being worried that change could nega- 
tively affect their socio-economic situation. They have generally been satisfied 
with what they get from their govemments, and even the existing extensive control 
the regimes exercise over them do not dispose them negatively to their rulers. This 
is why, for example, even the demands of opposition groups have only called for 
reforms, not for revolution: the opposition has wished to improve the operation of 
the existing regimes, not to overthrow them.139 The middle class in the GCC states
-  usually the main reformist, pro-democracy grouping in other parts of the world -  
has little reason to support the downfall of the monarchy. Members of this class, 
mostly private businessmen, learned that several countries in the region, Iraq and 
Iran in particular, have not done well sińce their monarchies were abolished, expe- 
riencing, among other disasters, bloody and destroying wars. And, significantly, 
the professionals and traders suffered in all these developments as much as every- 
body else. The military and majority of tribal sheiks, large beneficiaries of the ex- 
isting regimes, usually strongly support the rulers. So far, there has been no 
“revolutionary proletariat” in the GCC states; in futurę, only a growing number of 
young, unemployed school graduates may lead to the establishment of such 
a group. Last but definitely not least, most people lack political awareness; the civil 
society, the ultimate source of political change, is in the very preliminary stage of 
development.
Another reason why prospects for further democratization are not very 
good is that the existing opposition groups which demand changes in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and Kuwait, are relatively weak and divided, and have not produced char- 
ismatic leadership. As such, they cannot be compared with such movements as the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Islamie Salvation Front in Algeria, which 
have strongly challenged authorities. In Oman, Qatar and the UAE there is practi­
cally no opposition at all.
On the other hand, there are many factors which can further enhance the 
broadening of political representation and the “democratization drive”.
First of all, as has already been mentioned, in several GCC states: in Ku­
wait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, there are significant groupings pushing for democ­
ratization. Moreover, the presence of active parliaments and free media, wherever 
they are present, often boosts democratization process.140
Then, the economic situation can have a significant impact on the process. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the GCC countries are eaming far less than 
they used to during the oil bonanza three decades ago. While they are still rela- 
tively rich, several are running budget deficits, borrowing nationally and intema- 
tionally, and are tuming to expense cutting. Moreover, while until recently many
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services were free in the GCC countries, some regimes have begun to charge their 
citizens for them, and have even considered introducing income taxes. Should citi­
zens be obliged to pay for the running of the state, the state will be forced to open 
up to their scrutiny.
Another factor that can influence the change is the population of the GCC 
countries: not only is it growing at a rate that makes the maintenance of so gener- 
ous welfare states problematic, but it is also becoming more literate, educated, and 
urban: features that are characteristic for other societies that, in similar conditions, 
have usually experienced a political upheaval leading to further democratization.
Problems with succession, not clearly determined in all the GCC countries, 
can have destabilizing impact on the situation, which, paradoxically, can help to 
reform the regimes. In the case of Saudi Arabia there is a ąuestion of who will run 
the country when the end of the line of the sons of Abdel Aziz is reached. King 
Fahd is of poor health, and his two potential successors, Crown Prince Abdullah 
and Prince Sułtan, are over 70 years of age as well. In Oman, who will succeed 
Sułtan Qaboos, who has no offspring; in Kuwait, who will succeed Emir Jabir al- 
Ahmad al-Sabah and the Crown Prince Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, who are 
both old and in a very poor health. Will the futurę successions in the UAE go to the 
sons of the very old current ruler, or to sons of the Crown Prince, futurę ruler-to-be. 
A change for stronger, more determined and better educated, young leader, possi­
ble in these countries in the futurę, can allow for more regime liberalization, as has 
already been the case in Bahrain and Qatar.141
The continued existence of the Gulf monarchies is obviously not guaran- 
teed forever. According to some scholars, monarchies may even contain the seeds 
of their own destruction within themselves; Samuel Huntington referred to the 
situation as to “the king’s dilemma”.142 As F. Gregory Gause III explained: “In an 
age of increasingly participatory and nationalist politics, the king must present 
himself as a reformer, as someone who not only represents the nation but listens to 
it and works to improve its condition. But in doing so, he calls forth both societal 
demands and social groups that eventually undermine the monarchy. So kings can 
either be overthrown by ‘reformers’ early on, or they can stave off such efforts by 
actually reforming themselves, but this only postpones their day of reckoning.”143
Western (American) attempts to democratize the GCC regimes can bring 
both negative and positive results. On the one hand, they are often perceived as 
a plot to increase Western influence in the region and for that reason reforms, even 
proposed by the local Arabs, are often rejected “as realizing the American agenda”. 
On the other, the U.S. and European initiatives sometimes enhance actions by the 
GCC reformists; they provide them with additional rational and certain means to 
undertake them.
Events in the neighboring states: Egypt, Iran, Yemen, and the new Iraq, 
which all have more political representation of citizens in the process of govem-
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ance, indirectly influence also the peoples’ thinking across the borders; mostly 
through media reports but also through their citizens living in the GCC states.
The political reforms can weaken the existing regimes, or even de-stabilize 
the countries. The opposition forces in most GCC states are a to large extent rooted 
in Islamie fundamentalism, which, if coming to power through otherwise praised 
democratic elections, can reform the political system into a much less democratic 
(rather of the religious theocracy type) than the present one; in the latest parlia­
mentary elections in Kuwait and Bahrain the Islamists already won the majority 
and continue to press for Islamization of the countries.144 Vahan Zanoyan predicts 
that may happen in the near futurę:
The suppression of free flow of ideas in the past, the pent-up demand for 
change and the strong sense of frustration with both regional political conditions 
and domestic economic conditions will combine to give a strong initial lead to 
those with extremist religious or anti-modemization views. Those aspiring for civil 
society with liberał ideals, considerable religious and cultural tolerance and mod- 
emization are nowhere near as well organized as their opponents, simply because 
historically they were not allowed to be. Thus, these reforms could backfire if any 
single group or faction, including the religious establishment, had monopoly access 
(or even disproportionate access) to the means influencing public opinion or to 
setting the agenda for public debate.145
Not to jeopardize the futurę of their countries, but at the same time to pro- 
long existence of their own regimes, the GCC govemments need to address basie 
and long-neglected problems. Some experts believe that the single most important 
step is to enlarge the domestic political support base of each govemment and then 
to change the mode of govemance, which “while not necessarily taking the form of 
fuli democratization, would entail the formal establishment of civil liberties, recog- 
nition of limits on the powers of the state, and the establishment of meaningful 
procedures for popular political participation”.146 According to Zanoyan:
An important pre-requisite to all of the above is a fundamental recognition 
of the need to establish a conseąuential dialogue -  one that leads to real policy 
changes -  about the role of religion, the relationship of each society with the inter- 
national community, the objectives of development, the uses of public power and 
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship... Each country needs to ‘make peace’ 
with itself by arriving at a sustainable domestic political reconciliation, and every GCC 
govemment needs to arrive at a new ‘social contract’ with its own population.147
It remains to be seen whether the rulers of the GCC countries will be bold 
enough to take further actions to address these challenges.
Democratization is always a long lasting process. One can foresee further 
developments in the GCC states, which can lead towards that goal, but there are
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also many obstacles which can slow it down, or even reverse. What is, however, 
important is that the importance of democracy seems to be a growing understand- 
ing among the GCC peoples. In an interesting study carried out by the Al Khaleej 
newspaper in the UAE on March 12, 2002, 36 per cent out of 600 interviewed na- 
tionals declared that that a lack of democracy is the reason for the failure of Arabs 
in achieving their expectations.
Summarizing the analysis of political transformations in the GCC states, 
one can agree with the opinion of Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim that “although democ­
racy may not be realized within the coming decade, it is acąuiring a significant 
importance in the GCC states political life. Thus, its realization becomes a matter 
of time”.148 A thought that, however, should always be taken into account, is that 
democratization may not immediately produce more peaceful and stable GCC re­
gimes.
External efforts to democratize the Arab world. Impact of 9/11, the U.S. war 
on terror and the Iraąi war
In addition to domestic reasons to enhance political representation or even more 
broadly to democratize existing regimes, there has been in recent years an in- 
creased foreign pressure to enhance democratization of the Arab world, and Gulf 
monarchies in particular. After 9/11, with the U.S.-proclaimed “war on terror” 
there has been a number of voices in the United States calling Washington to “save 
the Arabs from corrupt autocrats and radical Islam as it once was about saving the 
world from communism” and to “pressure Arab states to democratize rather then 
shielding them”.149 Rohan Gunaratna in his book Inside al Qaeda asks: ‘Why is so 
many terrorists produced by Saudi Arabia? Because it’s not democratic, it’s not 
representative of the people.’150 Some have believed that the U.S. should start seri- 
ously supporting pro-democratic movements in the Arab world (as was the case 
earlier in Europę, while fighting communism) and therefore support people who 
want to modernize Islam and create open societies there, and stop supporting auto- 
cratic regimes, which is done only for short-term political, economic or military 
gains. Commenting on elections in Bahrain, S. Rob Sobhani wrote in the Wash­
ington Times on November 25, 2002, that “the United States has a vested interest in 
the success of King Hamad’s reform movement because tiny Bahrain can be 
a model for the rest of the Arab world, especially in neighboring Saudi Arabia. 
Shi’ite compromise a majority in the oil-rich eastem province of Saudi Arabia, 
where 25 per cent of the world’s remaining oil reserves is located. Therefore Bah­
rain should be rewarded and singled out for its bravery, friendship and pursuit of 
democracy”.
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Since September 11 the goal of democratizing the Arab Middle East has 
become elevated by the American govemment from a verbal ideał to national secu­
rity imperative. As Washington became convinced that autocracies were making 
Muslims, and particularly Arabs, especially vulnerable to the appeal of radical 
Islamist ideologies, the White House came to the conclusion that something has to 
be done with it.151 First, the administration decided that promotion of democracy 
should become a key component of the new National Security Strategy, initially 
released in September 2002. This document, which outlines the government’s 
overall plan for defending the United States and advancing its interest and values, 
declared that “America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human 
dignity and the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; 
freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic toler- 
ance; and respect for private property.” It claimed further that “We will actively 
work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to 
every comer of the world.”152
In December 2002, Collin Powell, the Secretary of State unveiled the “US- 
Middle East Partnership Initiative”.153 The initiative rested on three pillars, plan- 
ning that the U.S. government will: (1) “engage with public and private sector 
groups to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and pri- 
vate sector development”; (2) “partner with community leaders to close the free­
dom gap with projects to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, 
and lift the voices of women”; (3) “work with parents and educators to bridge the 
knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for higher education.” 
Powell announced that $29 million was allocated for the first part of the plan.154 
The essence of the initiative was supposed to be partnership with different indige- 
nous Arab reformers. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Bill 
Burns explained that it “means that we in the U.S. govemments must listen to ideas 
and advice and criticism and proposals from the region.”155 While noble in theory, 
the realization of the program was highly criticized. Most of the money was spent 
through Arab govemments or on training for govemment officials, not on programs 
aimed at developing nongovemmental pro-reform organizations. Altogether, the 
program did not stand a chance to serve “as a catalyst for a tangible political 
change.”156
Then the administration decided to reorient U.S. diplomacy and American 
foreign aid policy to lend support to pro-democratic movements in the region as 
well as develop public diplomatic campaign to win Arab “hearts and minds”. In
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particular, the special Arab-language radio stations were to promote American 
values, especially of religious tolerance, open debate and women rights; the Sawa 
(Together) radio-station and Al-Hurrah (The Free) television station were estab­
lished. In tum, study tours, scholarships and English-language studies were offered 
to expose Arabs to American democratic institutions and help them to leam and 
understand the country better. At the same time, for the first time ever, the United 
States govemment linked the provision of aid to human rights case in the Arab 
world. In August 2002, the White House rejected the Egyptian aid reąuest to pro­
test against sentencing of Egyptian-American democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibra- 
him and his colleagues to prison for alleged fraud and defamation.
In the meantime, President Bush himself became a great supporter of de­
mocratization of the Middle East, and Iraq in particular. In the commencement 
speech at West Point Military Academy on June 1, 2002, he declared that “the peo- 
ples of the Islamie nations want and deserve the same freedom and opportunities as 
people in every nation. And their govemments should listen to their hopes.” Ad- 
dressing the United Nations in September 12, 2002, he stated that “liberty for the 
Iraqi people is a great morał cause and a great strategie goal. The people of Iraq 
deserve it; the security of all nations requires it.”
The pro-democracy ideology adopted by the U.S. representatives was ac- 
companied by endless editorials and articles in major American newspapers 
“expounding an extraordinarily expansive, optimistic view of new democratizing 
mission for America in the Middle East”.157
Then, in March 2003, President George W. Bush decided to take enor- 
mously large and costly action to change the regime in Iraq. Among other motives 
for the action was his belief that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would allow to 
democratize the country rapidly, which, in effect, would produce a democratic 
boom in the Middle East, comparable to the successful one which occurred earlier 
in Eastem Europę and put an end to the Cold War.158 To stress the importance of 
that argument, the operation was termed Iraqi Freedom. There were two other rea- 
sons for Bush to invade Iraq: in the U.S. Saddam Hussein was perceived as an ac- 
complice, if not a sponsor, of Osama bin Laden, and Iraq was believed to have 
weapons of mass destruction threatening the region. As both reasons tumed out to 
have nothing in common with reality, the argument of the importance of democra­
tizing Arab countries to win the war on terror has become an especially important 
one. Interestingly enough, before the invasion, the State Department expressed 
doubt that installing a new regime in Iraq will foster the spread of democracy in the 
Middle East. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research pro- 
duced a report dated February 26, 2003, which argued that “even if some version of
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democracy took root ... anti-American sentiment is so pervasive that Iraqi elec­
tions in the short term could lead to the rise of Islamic-controlled govemments 
hostile to the United States.”159 But President Bush did not take such advice into 
account and proceeded with his invasion plan.
Arabs did not believe in Bush argumentation at all. For them “controlling 
oil”, “protecting Israel” and “weakening and dominating the Arab world” have 
been the motives behind the invasion and occupation of Iraq.160 “Bringing democ­
racy” has not been the reason they would believe at all. Large majority of Arabs 
has expected that the war in Iraq would result in more terrorism against the United 
States and less democracy in the region. For Arabs Saddam Hussein and Osama bin 
Laden remained highly admired world leaders.161 Trying to change such opinions, 
the State Department established the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in 
the Arab and Muslim World and appointed Edward Djerejian, former ambassador 
to Syria, to lead this team of experts to improve America’s communication with the 
region.
On November 6, 2003, President Bush delivered the now-famous address 
on the need to strengthen democracy around the world and, in particular, to support 
its development in the Middle East. He called to end “sixty years of Western na- 
tions excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East” and to 
adopt “a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East”.162 In terms 
of Iraq, Bush optimistically stated that the success for democracy there will “send 
forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran, that freedom can be the futurę of every 
nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be 
a watershed even in the global democratic revolution.” He mentioned, however, 
that everybody should be aware of the fact that democracy takes time to develop 
and because of that American commitment to democracy in the Middle East “must 
be the focus of American policy for decades to come.” Bush also pointed out that 
“modernization is not the same as Westemization” and democratization must al- 
ways reflect cultures and tradition of the region. Moreover, democracy can be re- 
alized in different political systems “constitutional monarchies, federal republics, 
or parliamentary systems.” He spoke positively of the rulers of Morocco, Oman, 
Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain and Qatar, supported Saudi Arabia’s “first steps toward 
reform” and urged Egypt to “show the way towards democracy in the Middle 
East.” President rejected exceptionalism of the Middle East as the region not hos-
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pitable to democracy, the idea which had often used to dominate thoughts of West­
ern politicians.
The American reaction to the speech was mixed.163 Many commentators 
praised it, some even compared it to President Ronald Reagan’s famous June 1982 
speech to members of the British Parliament, in which Reagan predicted the immi- 
nent demise of communism because of its failure to respect freedom and human 
rights and reward individual creativity. Others criticized it on the ground that he 
launched “a morał crusade in politically volatile regions without regard to poten- 
tially negative conseąuences”, waming that it may unintentionally bring into power 
Islamie regimes in the Middle East or plunge the region into a major turmoil.164 
They drew comparisons to Jimmy Carter’s policy, which in their opinion uninten­
tionally helped to destabilize the Shah’s regime while advocating human rights in 
Iran. Conservative realists, as Adam Gamfmkle, criticized Bush saying that what 
he really proposed was either “a major shift in U.S. attitudes toward the undemo- 
cratic ruling classes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others which we long 
called our friends”, what could jeopardize U.S. interests in the region, or “a perma- 
nent condition of blatant diplomatic hypocrisy”, unacceptable as well.165 According 
to Thomas Carothers from the Camegie Endowment for International Peace, Bush 
has confirmed by that speech his split personality: “Bush the realist actively culti- 
vates warm relations with friendly tyrants in many parts of the world, while Bush 
the neo-Reaganite makes ringing calls for a vigorous new democracy campaign in 
the Middle East.”166 Finally, there were skeptics, who claimed that Bush’s pro- 
fessed U.S. commitment to democracy was just rhetoric and would eventually sur- 
render to the pressures of economic and political interests.
In the Middle East reaction to Bush’s speech was generally negative. Me­
dia in the region, usually state-controled, criticized Washington’s arrogance, hy­
pocrisy, and interference in Arab intemal affairs.167
President Bush in his speech did not announce any new initiatives, nor did 
he define a specific set of policy guidelines. That was left for the White House 
administration which began working on details of the plan which later became 
called “The Greater Middle East Initiative”. The project proposed technical assis- 
tance to countries that hołd elections by 2006, setting up centers to train women 
managers, joumalists and NGOs activists as well as women primary school teach- 
ers (100,000 by 2008). It called for economic transformation “similar in magnitude 
to that undertaken by the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastem 
Europę”, mainly through the strengthening the private sector by proposed microfi-
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nancing: $400 loans to 1.2 million entrepreneurs (with women accounting for 
750,000 of that number) spread over five years. Besides these, the project proposed 
establishment of a Greater Middle East Development Bank, creation of free zones 
and pressure for Arab countries to join the World Trade Organization. Bush wanted 
to obtain broad intemational support for his initiative and planned to launch it at 
the G-8 summit. The plan was also supposed to alarm the G-8 members, empha- 
sizing that poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in the region, being the roots of 
extremism, terrorism, intemational crime and illegal migration were becoming 
a major threat to their security. At the same time, the plan presented the already 
existing European Middle East initiative (the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, 
the so-called Barcelona process) and the U.S. State Department sponsored “US- 
Middle East Partnership Initiative” as complimentary efforts. It also invoked the 
multilateral reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as if they were part of 
the same policy.168 The project was addressed to what was named the Greater Mid­
dle East, the area from North-West Africa to Afghanistan, including not only Arab 
states but also Israel, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
The working version of the project under the title “The G-8 Greater Middle 
East Partnership” leaked to liberał Arabie daily Al Hayat based in London in Feb­
ruary 2004, was met with strong criticism from Arab govemments, intellectuals 
and media. They saw in it an unacceptable intrusion in their intemal affairs (despite 
the fact that the project heavily drawn from the Arab-authored Arab Humań Devel- 
opment Report).169 One of the first and angriest Arab critiąues of the proposal was 
written by the chief editor of the Arab Humań Development Report, the Egyptian 
Nader Fergany. He accused the current U.S. administration of “the arrogant men- 
tality”, which “behave as if it can decide the fate of states and peoples”, and called 
the Arab states to reject the project.170 Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak fol- 
lowed the line, describing any attempt to impose reform from outside “delusional” 
and wamed that it would lead to “anarchy”. Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Sheikh 
Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, asserted that “the imposition of any foreign view is 
not in the interest of the countries of the region”. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, 
Prince Saud al-Faisal emphasized that the U.S. proposal included “elear accusa- 
tions against the Arab people and their govemments that they are ignorant of their 
own affairs... those behind this plan ignore the fact ... that we are able to handle 
our own affairs”.171 The Syrian Vice President, Abdel Halim Khaddam went as far 
as to claim that the initiative was “reminiscent of the situation after World War 
One, when major powers sought to carve up the region”.172 The Arab League Sec- 
retary-General Amre Moussa said that the project was “an unacceptable attempt at 
dictating the development paths the people should take without consulting
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them.”173 The Tunisian human rights activists Moncef Marzouki stressed “the total 
lack of credibility of the U.S. policy to promote democracy in the Arab world” and 
went on saying “that U.S. policy as a whole greatly facilitates the growth of ex- 
tremist Islamist forces, as we are seeing in Iraq and will see elsewhere.”174 Ques- 
tions were also raised about the new U.S.-proposed concept of the Greater Middle 
East, whose only common denominator seems to be that it includes countries 
“where hostility to the U.S. is strongest, in which Islamie fundamentalism in its 
anti-Westem form is most rife”.175
The Arab leaders’ criticism of the Bush plan were strengthened even fur­
ther by the comments of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney that like democracy was 
a precondition for peace and prosperity in Western Europę, the democratic reform 
is also essential to a resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict”.1 6 To many, this suggested 
a justification for postponing efforts to solve this conflict. Moreover, as Zbigniew 
Brzeziński noted, the plan for the Middle East “ignored the historical reality that 
democracy can flourish only in an atmosphere of political dignity. As long as Pal­
estinians live under Israeli control and are humiliated daily, they will not be at- 
tracted by the virtues of democracy. The same is largely true of the Iraqis under the 
American occupation... The program for Arab democracy will be more successful, 
and find wider acceptance, if it is matched by efforts to grant sovereignty to the 
Iraqis and Palestinians. Otherwise, democracy will be seen to many in the Arab 
world to be window dressing for continued extemal domination.”177
Many European commentators were also very critical about the U.S. pro­
posal. Gilbert Achcar wrote in Le Monde Diplomatiąue in April 2004 that Ameri- 
cans now “in the name of democratization” plan “to strengthen [their] grip on Mid­
dle Eastem oil wealth and markets and extend its network of military bases and 
facilities.” European govemments did not find the American initiative appealing 
either. They perceived it as a duplication of their long-term efforts to engage with 
Arab countries on issues of economic and political reform through the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. They feared that American neo-conservatives would 
appropriate European ideas to support “democratic imperialism” and that the U.S. 
initiative would jeopardize their own “soft” approach.178 Thus, European govem- 
ments and the E.U. itself inereased their democracy promotion efforts in the Mid­
dle East, “facilitating but not imposing change” and “building partnership” with 
countries of the region. In particular, they have inereased govemance funding and 
aid for the Arab govemments that have agreed to negotiate the human rights plans. 
Great Britain proposed a project entitled “Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamie
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World”, while Germany unveiled the program “Engaging with the Islamie World”, 
both stressing the partnership approach. European initiatives do not focus directly 
on promoting democracy in the region; political reforms are rather “hidden” within 
broader govemance and development proposals, “the logie being that the more 
surreptitious extemal actors’ efforts, the better the chance for success.”179
In such a situation, facing all this criticism, the U.S. govemment scaled- 
down the original proposal and at the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on June 
8-10, 2004, presented a new version of it under the name “The Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative”.180 That plan was eventually approved by the G-8 
leaders. The resolution adopted at that meeting called for “partnership for progress 
and a common futurę with the region”. That goal is to be achieved through the 
establishment of the “Forum for the Futurę”, a framework for regular ministerial 
meetings as well as parallel gatherings of civil society and business leaders to dis- 
cuss political and economic reforms.181 The initiative includes a microfmance pro­
gram to help smali entrepreneurs, a support for training programs for businesses 
and a project to enhance literacy. A cali to settle down the Israeli-Palestinian con- 
flict, the idea conspicuously absent from the earlier version of the plan, causing 
wide criticism, was this time included in the document. The plan acknowledged 
also that reforms cannot be imposed from outside and that different societies will 
change at different rates.
Thinking about ways to successfully democratize the Arab world, the U.S. 
recalled the successful Cold War’s so-called Helsinki process, where the West and 
the communist countries finally recognized European borders and committed 
themselves not to overturn each other’s govemments by force; in exchangę they 
agreed to a dialogue on human rights and inereased freedom for civic groups at 
home. Such an agreement is, however, impossible with the Middle East, at least in 
the foreseeable futurę. Thus, in the G-8 plan, despite some wording aimed to 
“soften” the approach, the Middle East states were treated as “targets” of the re­
form dialogue and Arab autocrats were not to receive much to be convinced to 
loosen control of their societies.182 At the same time, however, the plan includes 
business and civic actors into its dialogue on democracy; not limiting it only to 
govemments, it provides these groups with the potential for influencing Western 
policies towards the region (if they grasp the opportunity themselves).
The G-8 adopted reform plan for the Middle East, along with the UN Security 
Council resolution on Iraq voted at almost the same time indicated an important shift in 
Bush’s approach to foreign policy matters. In both cases the President accepted far- 
reaching compromises with the intemational community: it was the emphasis on mul- 
tilateralism, quite in contrast with highly criticized earlier American unilateral actions. 
Time will show whether this was truły a fairly permanent change in the U.S. dealings 
with the world’s problems or just the election-year image management.
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President Bush eontinued the promotion of the democratization agenda 
during his trip to the NATO summit in Turkey. He called on there Muslims nations 
to embrace democracy and wamed Middle East autocrats, including American 
allies, that they “must recognize the direction of events of the day”.183 The Presi­
dent furthermore acknowledged that Western nations helped to feed extremism by 
supporting repressive regimes for the sake of the region’s stability. Such policy 
“did not serve the people of the Middle East... and it has not made Western nations 
more secure”. Speaking at Galatasaray University Bush stated again that to con- 
front terrorism Muslims nations must modemize. He also warned the Middle East 
leaders that “suppressing dissidents only increases radicalism.”
Despite a new, better form, the G-8 reform plan received a cold reception 
in the Arab world. Only five Arab countries accepted President Bush’s invitation 
for launching it at the summit (only Bahrain from among the GCC states). The 
most important Arab countries: Saudi Arabia and Egypt (as well as close U.S. al­
lies: Kuwait and Morocco) turned the invitation down, making it elear that they 
would have nothing to do with the project. Only Jordan openly welcomed the plan 
as “reflective of the priorities of the region”, but even it wamed that reform im- 
posed from outside could backfire. “Opponents of political and social reform will 
conveniently label reform efforts as mere implementations of a western agenda 
against the interests of the Arab world and will probably get away with it.”184 Later 
also the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, approvingly stated 
that “the calls for reform coming from abroad need reflection by the people of our 
region”,185 while some Arab intellectuals declared that the U.S. plan could give 
impetus to homegrown reform movement.186 Nevertheless, many people in the 
Arab world view the democratization plan as a bargaining tactic by the U.S. to 
pressure longtime Arab allies into unpopular and difficult decisions, as e.g. pushing 
the Palestinians to accept unfavorable terms of agreement with the Israelis and 
supporting American policy in Iraq.
The problem is not that Arab politicians, journalists, intellectuals and peo­
ple reject what Bush is proposing as such. Majorities of Arabs and other broader 
Middle East populations support ideas of democracy; they want to live in the states 
where leaders are freely elected, where there is a freedom of speech and associa- 
tion, where there is equality of all citizens and where the rule of law is respected.187 
The problem is that the same people are against American ideas of democracy and 
the U.S. policies towards their countries (the U.S. Middle East policy in generał, 
support of Israel, and invasion and occupation of Iraq are the reasons most often 
cited). “The problem is the messenger not the message” -  said the Arab League 
representative, Nassif Hitti.188 In generał, the U.S. image in the Arab world is very
183 S. S ach s, “Bush urges all autocrats to yield now to democracy”, New York Times, June 30, 2004.
184 H. S a leh , “U.S. plan for Middle East worries Arab rulers”, Financial Times, June 11, 2004.
185 H. b in  K h a lifa  Al T h an i, “Out of the fog through Arab reform”, Daily Star, June 21, 2004.
186 “US reform plan can boost Arab movements”, Associated Press, July 8, 2004.
187 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
188 Nassif Hitti, „Find a fitting cure for the ‘sick man of the world’”, Daily Star, July 22, 2004.”
negative and in the last few years has continued to deteriorate: between 2002 and 
2004 the number of Arabs who rated the U.S. favorably declined in Morocco from 
38 to 11 per cent; in Jordan from 34 to 15 per cent; in Egypt from 15 to 2 per cent; 
in Saudi Arabia from 12 to 4 per cent.189 “After what has happened in Iraq, there is 
unprecedented hatred [of Americans] never eąualed in the region”, said President 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the key ally of the U.S. in the region where nearly 100 
percent of the population held an unfavorable opinion of the country.190 Trust to­
wards the U.S. has plunged so deeply that even if Bush is not re-elected, any new 
administration will find regaining it a very difficult task.
Critics of new American foreign policy goals especially object to selectiv- 
ity of the neoconservatives: their support of authoritarian regimes in Uzbekistan, 
Pakistan, Tunisia and Jordan, as opposed to their eagemess to invade Iraq in the 
name of bringing democratic rule there or attempts to remove from office demo- 
cratically elected Yasser Arafat. This rises the question whether Washington’s 
declared policy to support democratization of the Middle East is going to be stable, 
or is the neoconservative attitude towards democracy a “marriage of convenience” 
rather than a permanent commitment based on certain ideology.191 In the past, es­
pecially during Reagan’s presidency, ‘neocons’ supported friendly autocratic re­
gimes and non-democratic right-wing ‘freedom fighters’; in 1991 they did not op- 
pose canceling first democratic elections in Algeria, only because it was to bring 
into power anti-American Islamists. It was only after September 11 and the Af­
ghanistan campaign that neocons began to admit that anti-American terrorism was 
caused by oppressive Arab autocracies and promote the “democratization drive” in 
the Middle East. As a result, they changed the direction of their previous policy 
accordingly. Another question asked here is whether the newly proclaimed promo- 
tion of democracy in the Arab world will ever rank in the “neocons”’ policy priori- 
ties as high as their commitment to Israeli security (their main argument for strate­
gie alliance with Israel has been that the Jewish state is the only democratic state in 
the Middle East among Arab autocracies). There are certain doubts about that.
The paradox of the current situation is that the United States has never 
enjoyed greater power than it does today, yet at the same time U.S. possesses little 
influence on developments in most countries in the world. The Washington gov- 
emment can compel, but far too often cannot persuade.192 In effect, many Ameri­
can initiatives, like advancing reforms in the Middle East or defeating terrorism, 
may not fully succeed.
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Arab pro-democracy declarations. A response to the U.S. plans?
In the last two or so years some Arab states decided to introduce certain political 
reforms.193 Morocco expanded rights of women; Qatar adopted a new constitution 
providing for a partially elected parliament and held municipal elections; Bahrain 
became a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and active opposi­
tion; Saudi Arabia’s rulers called for political and economic reform in the whole 
Arab world (the so-called Prince Abdullah plan), organized several debates with 
broad rangę of participants, including Islamists and other opposition figures, and 
announced first municipal elections. Moreover, in the first half of 2004, the League 
of Arab States as well as different parties in several Arab countries produced decla­
rations on the need for broad political, social, and economic reforms. There is no 
doubt that many of these actions were inspired or at least invigorated by American 
democratization initiatives.
First, in January 2004, there was a large intemational conference in Sanaa, 
Yemen, where the declaration was adopted calling for periodically elected legisla- 
tures in Arab countries, a free media, the separation of institutional powers and 
women’s empowerment. The conference established the Arab Democratic Dia­
logue Forum aimed at promoting dialogue, strengthening democracy, human rights 
and civil liberties, especially freedom of opinion and expression, and reinforcing 
the partnership between public authorities and civil society.194
Then, on March 3, the banned Muslim Brotherhood unveiled in Cairo its 
own reform initiative. The initiative demanded that the Egyptian govemment re- 
scinds the emergency law and other restrictions on political activity and limit the 
power of the presidency. The plan further called for reducing the role of the mili- 
tary in politics, privatization of Egypt’s economy, purging non-Islamic materials 
from the media and fostering independence of the judiciary system.
A few days later, on March 12-14, intellectuals and civil society activists, 
together with former Arab ministers and other govemment officials discussed the 
issue of reform in Alexandria, Egypt. The adopted declaration demanded putting an 
end to the emergency laws existing in many Arab countries, executive term limits, 
regular elections and a clear-cut separation between legislative and executive pow­
ers.195 The declaration further stressed the universal character of democratic values 
and the urgent need to promote them in the Arab world. “It is a cali on the Arabs to 
adopt democracy -  not because the West wants them to, but because it is best for 
them.”196 Characteristically, the statement did not mention the occupation of Iraq 
and Palestine as an obstacle to reforms in the region.
The Arab League, for the first time in its history, managed to take a posi- 
tion on the political reform issue at its summit in Tunis in May 2004 (although not
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without problems; the first meeting in Tunis in March was cancelled at the last 
minutę due to disagreements over the summit outcome197). The declaration, 
adopted at the May summit pledged to ‘reaffirm attachment’ to human rights, and 
to ‘reinforce’ freedom of expression, thought, and worship, and the independence 
of judiciary as well as to “consolidate democratic practice, broaden participation in 
political and public life, reinforce the role of all components of civil society... and 
widen women’s participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and educa- 
tional fields.”198 However, the declaration said that reforms should be implemented 
in accordance with “A Course for Development and Modemization in the Arab 
World” -  a framework document prepared in Cairo before the summit, where it 
was explained that reforms should take place according to each country’s “cultural, 
religious, and civilizational understandings and values, circumstance and capabili- 
ties”. The Tunis summit also adopted a revised version of the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights, which will enter into force once it has been ratified by seven mem- 
ber states.
In tum, on June 3-4, 2004, the Qatar University hosted a conference of 
Arab democracy advocates: civil society activists, professors, journalists and mem­
bers of political movements from across the region. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in his widely reported speech opening the event 
stated that: (1) Arab states should consider U.S. proposals for democratic reform 
rather than rejecting them outright; (2) there are many problems of Arab own crea- 
tion “that have nothing to do with the outside world”, in particular, the ones that do 
not “spring only from the Palestinian cause”; (3) many Arabs have claimed that if 
popular participation is broadened it would only result in bringing to power those 
who would endanger peace security. “Yet, the adoption of reforms has always been 
the right way to stability”.199 There are not many Arab leaders who would say such 
things so openly, opposing the popular Islamist standpoint. The conference adopted 
“The Doha Declaration for Democracy and Reform”, calling all Arab states to get 
modem, democratic institutions; hołd free, fair and regular elections; place limits 
on executive powers; guarantee freedom of association and expression; permit fuli 
participation of women in political life; and end extra-judicial procedures, emer- 
gency laws, and torturę. It also called for the creation of a body to monitor Arab 
govemments’ progress on reform and to track the fate of other reform initiatives 
launched recently in the region. Finally, the declaration stated that “hiding behind 
the necessity of resolving the Palestinian ąuestion before implementing reform is 
obstructive and unacceptable”.
All these declarations have constituted a new phenomenon in the Arab 
world. Reformists, civil society activists, intellectuals, joumalist, although not the 
un-invited Islamists, with the approval of their govemments, and usually with par- 
ticipations of the heads of state and other officials openly debated vital issues re- 
lated to democratization. But, as Rosemarie Hollis remarked, “it should not stop at
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the issuing of a statement that everybody is committed to reform. Unless it is ac- 
companied by some real changes, it is insufficient to address the issue.”200 On the 
other hand, these eyents have provided an opportunity for the West, and the United 
States in particular, to obtain new forums and identify individuals who could be- 
come real and important partners in their democratization attempts.
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